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ABSTRACT 
Helpful and hurtful behavior are commonly viewed as antithetical, with little overlap 
and are commonly found to be negatively related (e.g., Anderson et al., 2010). Anecdotally, 
however, there are many instances of behaviors that can be generally considered as 
representative of both help and harm (CBS, 2015; Karimi, 2015). Such behaviors, which I 
refer to as Prosocial Aggression (PA), have received relatively little attention in the social 
psychological literature. Two factors are identified as potential sources of this inattention. 
First, there is no current theoretical framework integrates social psychological theories of 
prosocial and aggressive behavior. Second, practical limitations of studying PA make such 
work difficult. The work presented here was designed to address these two limitations by 
developing a coherent theoretical account of PA behavior and validating a novel measure of 
PA. To this end, two studies were conducted. Study 1 provided an initial test of the PA task 
by manipulating the presence of victimization followed by measuring aggression toward the 
victimizer. In addition to the manipulation, long-term predictions of the PA model were 
tested in a cross-sectional manner. Personality factors that are theoretically relevant to PA 
(i.e., empathic anger, anti-bullying attitudes) were tested as likely predictors of PA behavior. 
Finally, an experiment (Study 2) tested the short-term predictions of the PA model in which 
empathy toward the (soon-to-be) victim, and vulnerability of the victim were manipulated 
and PA was subsequently measured. Results indicated no effect of either manipulation on 
PA. In addition, neither empathic anger, nor anti-bullying attitudes predicted PA. Discussion 
focuses on potential theoretical and methodological factors that may have limited the PA 
task’s effectiveness with an emphasis placed on directing future investigations into PA. 
Key words: prosocial; violence; aggression; helping; third-party punishment 
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CHAPTER 1.    CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
On August 21st, 2015, a man boarded a French train, armed with a pistol, assault rifle, 
and a box cutter. When he opened fire, five men, including three Americans, charged and tackled 
the gunman. While the gunman was subdued, the men sustained gunshot and knife injuries 
(Karimi, 2015). In a less severe (and less well-known) incident, a California teenager observed a 
blind classmate being repeatedly struck by a bully. He responded by striking the bully to the 
ground, ending the episode quickly, albeit violently (CBS, 2015). These two incidents differ 
dramatically in age of the participants, geographic location, and severity, but are both 
characterized by behaviors that are simultaneously aggressive, and helpful, a type of behavior 
that is the focus of this manuscript and is henceforth referred to as prosocial aggression (PA).  
 Whereas these incidents are certainly noteworthy, PA is not limited to such extreme 
events. For instance, parents routinely punish children for misbehaving. The child who learns to 
delay gratification (due in part to experiences of punishment) in order to finish chores may be 
more likely to delay gratification in order to study for tests, complete additional job applications, 
spend additional time on a client’s commission, and so forth. In other words, the aggressive act 
of punishment is used as a tool used to increase the likelihood of the child’s success in their 
social and professional world and produce a potent long-term positive outcome. In this sense, the 
punishment itself is a truly prosocial act. 
Children routinely encounter situations in which prosocial and aggressive behavior co-
occur. Classroom bullying is among the most common observed by children, with approximately 
1 in 4 middle school students reporting having been bullied (Zhang, Musu-Gillette, & Oudekerk, 
2016). Students must often decide whether to ignore the behavior (which may incur the smallest 
social cost), tell an adult (and risk label as a tattletale and/or being targeted by the bully) or 
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confront the bully on behalf of the victim. This confrontation can come in many forms but at 
minimum, confronting a bully requires aggression as one’s goal is to thwart the bully’s goal of 
harming another. This thwarting can take the form of expressing disapproval of the bully’s 
behaviors or intentions, physically intervening to shield the victim, or even verbally or physically 
aggressing against the bully. 
 Those who belong to military organizations around the world provide some of the most 
extreme examples of prosocial aggression. Soldiers join the military for several reasons but 
ensuring the safety of one’s friends, family, and country is certainly among them (Pew Research 
Center, 2011). On the battlefield, soldiers engage in extreme aggression to keep their friends safe 
from harm. Such instances perhaps represent the most extreme examples of PA, combining what 
can be considered the most extreme form of aggression (taking a life) with the most extreme 
form of helping behavior (saving a life). 
 There is a dizzying variety of PA behaviors, each characterized by differing degrees of 
prosocialness and aggressiveness. Figure 1 demonstrates the broad applicability of this concept 
to a number of example behaviors, each of which is provided with a hypothetical prosocialness 
and aggressiveness rating. The purpose of the illustration is not to imbue these behaviors with 
“positive” or “negative” socio-cultural values, but to identify the theoretically useful tool of 
considering the two-dimensional nature of these and related behaviors. As the examples 
discussed thus far make clear, aggressive behaviors are not inherently negative or positive, but 
serve as a useful social tool that can be used to meet either end. In the case of PA, from the 
actor’s perspective, it is always both. 
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Figure 1. Hypothetical mapping of example behaviors’ aggressive and prosocial components 
Of course, this illustration dramatically oversimplifies the rich complexity of unique 
internal and external forces driving any given PA act. It is, however, useful to consider the 
relative degree of “activity” of aggression and prosocial-related processes. At low levels of 
aggressiveness and high prosocialness, one can expect empathic and helping-related processes to 
be the predominant psychological forces at work and vice versa. The most theoretically 
interesting contributions of studying PA likely lie in investigations centered along both of these 
dimensions as a full understanding of the interactions between these two “families” of processes 
would undoubtedly prove valuable to psychological science given their typically antithetical 
nature. 
Killing an enemy 
soldier to save an ally
Parental punishment
Physically fighting a 
bully
Suing a company for 
unsafe working 
conditions
Shielding a victim
Boycotting an 
environmentally unsafe 
product
Intimidating a teen 
child's prom date
Napping
Airing attack ads 
against a political 
opponent
Hypothetical Plot of Prosocially Aggressive Behaviors
Very prosocial 
Very 
aggressive 
Not prosocial 
Not 
aggressive 
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 Despite the apparent prevalence of PA, research that is theoretically relevant to PA 
typically focuses on either aggressive behavior or prosocial behavior independently. Such work 
is only peripherally valuable in assisting scientists with making predictions regarding behaviors 
that are characterized by aspects of both prosociality and aggression. Further, the scientific 
understanding of human behavior is incomplete without thorough consideration of the 
intersection between these seemingly distinct, but highly prevalent social behaviors. 
 This critique of the current social psychological literature certainly doesn’t preclude 
consideration of the well-studied processes involved in both prosocial and aggressive behavior 
when attempting to understand PA behavior. Undoubtedly, a complete understanding of PA 
behavior requires full explication of the processes that underlie both prosocial and aggressive 
behavior. Next, I discuss models of aggressive and prosocial behavior as described by the 
General Aggression Model (GAM; Anderson & Bushman, 2002), General Learning Model 
(GLM; Buckley & Anderson, 2006; Gentile, Groves, & Gentile, 2014), as well as other theories 
that are relevant to PA behavior. 
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CHAPTER 2.    AGGRESSIVE PROCESSES AND THEORIES 
 Aggression is defined as “any behavior directed toward another individual that is carried 
out with the proximate (immediate) intent to cause harm. In addition, the perpetrator must 
believe that the behavior will harm the target, and that the target is motivated to avoid the 
behavior” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, pp. 28).  
Briefly, it is worth discussing the distinction between hostile and instrumental aggression. 
Hostile aggression is considered impulsive, affectively driven, and has the ultimate goal of 
harming the other person. Instrumental aggression, in contrast, is aggression is enacted with the 
intent of achieving some ultimate goal other than harming another person. While it may appear 
that these two forms of aggression are fairly distinct, there is significant overlap, particularly as 
the aggressor’s goals shift during a social encounter. For instance, the observation of bullying 
behavior may initiate a retaliatory response by a third party in order to protect the victim (a fairly 
instrumental process). In an identical scenario, the third party may feel anger on behalf of the 
victim and aggress against the bully – engaging in behavior with the ultimate goal of harming the 
bully (a relatively hostile process). Both instances appear identical but reflect separate goals that 
may or may not be stable throughout a given behavioral episode. Issues such as this have 
prompted theorists to suggest that the distinction between hostile and instrumental aggression 
produces a false dichotomy that fails to account for mixed motives (Bushman & Anderson, 
2001). Instead, models of aggression that consider the role of knowledge structures in 
understanding aggression, such as the General Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002) 
and other social cognitive models are much better able to handle the complexity inherent in most 
aggressive behavior. Understanding PA behavior is likely to be best understood, at least partially, 
through this model, to which I turn next. 
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 The General Aggression Model (GAM) is a model of aggressive behavior that is 
designed to incorporate all sources of influence, including social, biological, cultural, and 
cognitive forces. The model distinguishes between short and long-term process that give rise to 
aggression. The short-term processes describe the series of events that occur within a given 
social situation that determine the likelihood of aggressive behavior. The long-term processes 
describe the factors that contribute to the development of the aggressive personality, which 
influences the likelihood of aggressive responding across situations. As a domain-general theory 
of aggression, GAM is not designed to elaborate upon the specifics of the multitude of processes 
that produce aggressive responding. Instead, GAM is designed to integrate existing domain-
specific theories of aggression into a coherent framework. Each of these theories describes 
factors that may increase or decrease the likelihood of aggressive responding and thus may be 
relevant for the likelihood of engaging in PA behavior.  
Domain specific theories of aggression. There are five major theories of aggression that are 
explicitly incorporated into GAM. While discussion here is limited largely to these five theories, 
it should be noted that any theory of aggression can be integrated into the GAM framework. The 
five theories discussed here, however, are among the most heavily tested and influential in the 
psychological study of aggression. 
Excitation transfer theory. Excitation transfer theory, developed by Zillman (1971), applies to 
relatively specific situations compared to many of the other theories discussed here. The theory 
relies upon an understanding of attribution processes and the role of arousal in the generation of 
aggressive responding. Specifically, the theory considers the misattribution of arousal derived in 
a previous situation to a current situation. 
7 
 
 One tool that individuals use to understand their environment is their current 
physiological state (Schachter & Singer, 1962), which can be used to interpret how they are 
feeling or reacting to a given event. When individuals become aroused (e.g., from riding a 
bicycle), their arousal takes time to dissipate. The arousal derived in one situation can therefore 
be carried into a subsequent situation and affect the social encounter. If, for example, 
provocation is experienced in a subsequent situation, the arousal derived in the previous situation 
is misattributed to the provocation, increasing the perception of one’s own anger and 
consequently exacerbates the reaction (Zillman & Bryant, 1974). 
Cognitive neo-association theory. Cognitive neo-association theory was developed in order to 
iterate upon the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939), which states that “people 
are driven to attack others when they are frustrated: when they are unable to reach their goals, or 
they do not obtain the rewards they expect” (Berkowitz, 1993, p. 30). In its basic form, the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis states that all aggression results from frustration in some form. 
Cognitive neo-association theory, in contrast, posits that aversive experiences (not simply 
frustration) instigate negative affect, which in turn activates fight or flight responses. This 
improvement helped explain some experimental findings that the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis could not handle directly (e.g., the role of arbitrariness in the elicitation of frustration; 
Cohen, 1955) and generalizes across various types of aversive experiences (Berkowitz, 1989). 
 Critically, cognitive neo-association theory incorporates a knowledge structure approach 
to understanding aggressive responding. It relies on the understanding that thoughts, emotions, 
and behavioral propensities are linked together in memory in a conceptual network (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975). When a concept is activated (e.g., when viewing the image of a gun), a spreading 
of activation occurs in which concepts closely related to the target concept (e.g., kill) are 
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subsequently activated (i.e., primed). The network of concepts related to the target concept is 
thereby readied for use and assists in generating potential plans of action, evaluating stimuli, 
triggering emotional responses, and selecting behavioral sequences for execution. 
Script theory. In what can be thought of as a specific form of knowledge structure, a script 
(Abelson, 1981; Huesmann, 1988) is a cognitive organization of concepts that guide behavior in 
specific situations. A script is a well-rehearsed sequence of actions (behavioral, cognitive, and 
affective) that guide an individual through a social series of events. An easily understood basic 
example of a script can be seen during a typical outing at a restaurant. Patrons arrive at the 
restaurant, wait to be seated, order drinks, order food, wait, are served, eat, pay, and leave. 
Scripts such as this one can be learned through observation (e.g., on television) or 
directly experienced (e.g., being guided by a server). Repeated rehearsals (whether through 
observation or action) of a script increase its likelihood of being used for two main reasons. First, 
scripts can be rehearsed across many situations, expanding the repertoire of appropriate social 
scenarios that call for the script to be activated. Second, multiple rehearsals of scripts also 
increase the strength of links between concepts contained within the script (e.g., waiting to be 
seated – be guided to seat), making the activation of a script-relevant concept increasingly likely 
to engage the associated script. In short, this engenders a chronic accessibility of the script. 
The development and reinforcement of scripts provides individuals with a method of 
automatizing normally complex social interactions that would otherwise require substantial 
cognitive resources to process. If verbal retaliation to a dirty look in a high school hallway is 
consistently rewarded, and passivity punished, it is to a student’s advantage to quickly enact the 
scripted response of retaliation rather than process each aspect of the social situation to 
determine the appropriate response. 
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Social learning theory. Of course, the acquiring of these scripts (such as the one described 
above) is essentially a learning process that is driven by interactions with the social environment. 
This acquiring of knowledge from the social environment is detailed by social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1971). Broadly (and briefly) social learning theory states that individuals learn by 
either direct experience or by observing others. The theory details the social interaction processes 
(e.g., modeling, vicarious reinforcement) that determine what individuals learn and how they are 
likely to use that information. 
 Importantly, social learning theory illustrates the importance of outcome expectancies 
(e.g., expected rewards; Williams, 2010) and expectations regarding one’s ability to carry out a 
behavioral plan (i.e., efficacy expectations; Lee, 1984). In the above example, a physically 
intimidating student who lacks the verbal intelligence required for an exchange of insults may 
favor a physical altercation as an alternative. In other words, the efficacy expectations inform the 
selection of the appropriate script. 
Social interaction theory. Of particular relevance to PA, social interaction theory focuses on the 
higher-level goals that drive aggressive behavior. That is, the theory interprets aggressive 
behavior as a coercive action that is used to influence others. Such influence is used to gain 
goods or services (e.g., money, information, sex), demonstrate status and establish a reputation 
(e.g., for toughness), restore justice, or discourage others’ behavior (i.e., via punishment). 
 Harkening back to the distinction between instrumental and hostile aggression and its 
application to PA, social interaction theory clearly emphasizes the instrumental component of 
aggressive responding. It focuses heavily on the practical values of aggression, viewing the 
aggressor as a decision maker whose behavior is driven by estimated probabilities of success, 
values of rewards, and the costs of actions. The social interaction theory approach to 
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understanding PA focuses on explicating the practical goals of engaging in PA (e.g., reducing 
short and long-term victimization behavior, providing the victim with a sense of justice), as well 
as the motivational and behavioral consequences of these goals. 
Desensitization. Basic habituation learning indicates that repeated exposure to a stimulus reduces 
the impact that stimulus has on subsequent exposures. Desensitization often refers to affective 
reactions to stimuli, but can also refer to physiological reactions (Carnagey, Anderson, & 
Bushman, 2007), or may refer to more “cold” cognitive reactions to stimuli, such as when 
increasingly violent content over time may be required to capture and hold attention of media 
viewers (Slater, Hnery, Swaim, & Anderson, 2003). In some contexts, desensitization can be 
quite adaptive, as when a soldier is not startled by the horrible sights of war. However, anxiety in 
response to viewing aggressive and violent behavior serves as an inhibitor of such behavior 
(Bartholow, Bushman, & Sestir, 2006). In line with this view, desensitization to violence has 
been associated with increases in aggressive thoughts and behaviors (Engelhardt, Bartholow, 
Kerr, & Bushman, 2011; Krahé et al., 2011). 
Single cycle episode. The single cycle episode (Figure 2), described by GAM, illustrates the 
psychological processes that influence the likelihood of aggressive responding within any given 
immediate social situation. Briefly, an episode begins with two sources of input: the situation and 
the person. These two factors influence the individual’s internal state, which includes cognition, 
affect, and arousal. Decision and appraisal processes are then engaged and result in a behavioral 
response (or non-response) to the situation, which influences the situation and initiates a new 
cycle. Next, I discuss each of these steps in more detail. 
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Figure 2. Single-episode cycle of the General Aggression Model. Reprinted with permission from 
Anderson & Bushman (2002) 
 
Inputs. Person factors include all of the largely stable, persisting characteristics that an 
individual carries across situations. Obvious examples of person factors include heavily 
biologically based variables such as sex or baseline testosterone. They also include much less 
well understood factors such as genetic predispositions toward aggressive learning and 
responding. Personality traits also fall under the person input factor and (among many others) 
include trait aggression and unstable narcissism (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). 
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 There are several cognitive dispositions that are also included in the person input factor. 
For instance, individuals differ in their tendency to interpret neutral stimuli in hostile terms (as 
compared to benign terms); called their hostile attribution bias (Crick & Dodge, 1996). They also 
differ in their tendency to expect aggressive outcomes to ambiguous situations (e.g., for a fight to 
break out; Dill, Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1997). 
 Attitudes, beliefs, and values also fall under the realm of person variables. For instance, 
positive attitudes toward aggression (Vernberg, Jacobs, & Hershberger, 1999), belief that 
aggressive responding is normal (Möller & Krahé, 2009), and even expectation of approval for 
aggressive behavior are associated with aggression (Borden, 1975). 
 Situation variables, on the other hand, are the prominent features of a given situation that 
have an influence on aggressiveness. The simplest, and perhaps most important situation variable 
is provocation (Denson, Pedersen, Friese, Hahm, & Roberts, 2011). Indeed, provocation in the 
form of insults (Pedersen, Vasquez, Bartholow, Grosvenor, & Truong, 2014), shocks (Giancola 
et al., 2002), and noise blasts (Cohen’s d = 1.43, p < .001, Groves, 2012), to name a few, are 
reliable elicitors of aggression. 
 The presence of aggressive cues (or primes) provide a fairly automatic activation of 
aggressive responding (i.e., a postconscious automatic process; Bargh, 1992). Foundational work 
regarding this automatic activation of aggressive responding grew from experimental work 
regarding the weapons effect (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967). Such work extends to multiple 
domains and is considered a central process responsible for the violent media effect (Anderson & 
Dill, 2000; Groves, Prot, & Anderson, 2015). 
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 Pain and discomfort also appear to produce aggressive responding across a wide variety 
of stimuli (Groves & Anderson, 2017). Such work on aversive events demonstrate the aggression 
increasing effects of pain (both acute [Ulrich & Azrin, 1962] and chronic [Margari et al., 2014]), 
bitter taste (Sagioglou & Greitemeyer, 2014), uncomfortable temperatures (Anderson & 
Anderson, 1998), stressful events (Guerra et al., 1995), and crowding (Lawrence & Andrews, 
2004), to name a few. 
As suggested by the discussion of social interaction theory, the presence of incentives or 
goals that require aggressive responding also serve as a risk factor for aggressive responding 
(e.g., contract killing, competitive academic or professional environments). Such responding 
obviously tends toward more instrumental forms of aggression, but can produce more hostile 
forms of aggression when frustrations result from the pursuit of the desired object. 
Each of the above described person and situation variables provide reliable elicitation of 
aggression (i.e., each produce a main effect) but it should be noted that GAM is not limited to the 
incorporation of such simple effects. Interactions between the person and situation variables are 
extremely common and are explicitly considered by GAM. For instance, as mentioned, 
biological sex consistently predicts aggressive responding. This sex effect, however, tends to be 
much smaller in the presence of provocation (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996).  
Routes. Such main and interaction effects, of course, do not themselves directly impact 
aggression. Instead, they affect internal processes, called routes, which in turn, influence the 
decision making processes that produce aggressive responding. The internal states are placed in 
three broad categories of cognition, affect, and arousal. It is important to note that each of these 
internal states does not operate in isolation, but mutually interact with each other, either by 
exacerbating or regulating each other’s effects. Next, I briefly discuss these categories in turn. 
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Arousal. Arousal can increase aggression in at least three ways (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). 
First, arousal can increase the dominant action tendency, which may include the aggressive 
response. This effect forms the basis of social facilitation (Bond & Titus, 1983). Second, as 
described above, arousal from one source can be misattributed to a subsequent stimulus (e.g., a 
provocation) and mislabeled as anger (Rule & Nesdale, 1976; Schachter & Singer, 1962), 
thereby exacerbating (or instigating) an aggressive response. Lastly, as proposed by Anderson & 
Bushman (2002), excessive or insufficient arousal, if perceived as aversive, may increase 
aggressive responding through the natural response to aversive experience. 
Affect. The clearest contributor to the affective component of internal states regarding aggressive 
behavior is anger. It serves as the basis for some of the more hostile forms of aggression and is a 
well-established mediator for a number of effects (e.g., Peters, Geiger, Smart, & Baer, 2013).  
Cognition. There is now a large number of studies that illustrate the role of aggressive cognition 
in aggressive behavior. Many of the domain-specific theories of aggression directly address the 
roles of cognitive processes in the regulation and production of aggression. Aggressive 
knowledge structures can be broadly primed to affect aggressive behavior (Bartholow, Anderson, 
Carnagey, & Benjamin, 2005). Perceptual processes can be biased toward interpreting 
ambiguous social interactions as provocations (Crick & Dodge, 1996). Self-regulation and 
impulsiveness make the inhibition of aggressive responding less likely (Connor, Chartier, Preen, 
& Kaplan, 2010; Swing & Anderson, 2014). 
Decision making processes. These internal states then feed into decision making processes. 
These decision making processes begin with an initial appraisal, which occurs without 
awareness, is relatively effortless, and is thus largely automatic. This initial appraisal contains 
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affective, goal, and intention information (e.g., anger, a goal to harm the other, and a script that 
details how to attain that goal). 
 Three conditions determine whether the initial appraisal leads directly to behavior. The 
first condition is that the outcome of the behavior must be considered important (and worthy of 
attention). The outcome must also be evaluated as unsatisfying (e.g., the current script would not 
inflict enough [or inflict too much] harm). Finally, the individual must have the resources 
required (e.g., time) to reappraise. If these three conditions are met, a reappraisal process results. 
 The reappraisal process involves a reevaluation of one or more aspects of the initial 
appraisal. The individual could reconsider features of the current situation that would inform the 
appraisal. A search for relevant information in memory could be executed (e.g., a history of 
similar interactions with the target person). Also, alternative behavioral scripts could be 
entertained. The reappraisal process could include many or few cycles as alternatives are 
considered. Briefly, this appraisal process shouldn’t be considered distinct from the internal 
processes as it interacts with the present internal state at every stage. For instance, the scripts that 
are selected are (among other things) the product of one’s history of reinforcement and the 
currently activated knowledge structures in memory. Once the behavior is executed, it affects the 
situation, which, in turn, serves as the input for the next cycle.  
Long-term processes. Over repeated cycles, the individual learns and develops stable 
characteristics (e.g., knowledge, personality changes, and goals) that persist across situations, as 
represented by the person input variable. In other words, the person input variable is not static, 
but constantly changes as a function of each single cycle learning episode. 
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 Five long-term processes are explicitly considered by GAM, but it should be noted that 
any long-term changes in the person that moderate aggressive responding across situations can 
be incorporated. The first (and perhaps the simplest) of these long-term processes is 
desensitization. A result of basic habituation learning, desensitization occurs when individuals 
experience a reduction in response intensity (e.g., physiological, emotional) after viewing 
aggression or victimization (Carnagey, Anderson, & Bushman, 2007). 
 Aggressive attitudes and beliefs also clearly fall within the domain of long-term 
processes. As individuals observe (or experience) the success of aggressive responding, they 
learn that aggression is an effective means of attaining desired goals (e.g., respect, dominance, 
items of interest). Each instance of successful aggression reinforces beliefs that aggression is 
effective, useful, and the positive feelings associated with success are paired with (associated 
with) the aggressive act. These aggressive attitudes and beliefs then serve as a stable guide for 
behavior across situations in which the individual learns to expect positive outcomes to result 
from aggressive responding. 
 Aggressive perceptual and expectations also contribute to stable aggressive responding 
over time. In essence, these two factors describe the tendency for aggressive individuals to 
perceive stimuli in hostile terms (i.e., a hostile attribution bias) and the tendency for these 
individuals to expect potential conflict situations to result in aggression. Of course, the 
expectations we have regarding how a situation may unfold serves to drive the scripts that 
individuals may select and enact. For instance, if one believes that another is likely to begin a 
fight, they may be more likely to (literally) beat them to the punch.  
 The theories and model put forth by GAM provide a detailed explanation of the processes 
that give rise to aggressive behavior. Critically, it also outlines many factors that may increase or 
17 
 
decrease aggression at multiple “points” among the psychological “steps” that occur in the 
production of aggression. Certainly, such theory provides valuable insight into some of the 
processes at work when individuals engage in PA behavior. Of course, however, there are a 
number of other processes, related to empathy and prosocial behavior, which are critical to 
understanding when PA behavior is likely to occur, what factors affect the likelihood of 
engaging in PA behavior, and what processes ultimately give rise to PA behavior. It is to these 
empathic and helping processes that I discuss next. 
  
18 
 
CHAPTER 3.    MODELS AND PROCESSES OF EMPATHY AND HELPING 
 There are two models of helping behavior that are particularly useful for explaining the 
empathic/helping component of PA behavior. Further, both models lend themselves to 
integration with GAM to better understand PA behavior. The first of these models is the General 
Learning Model (GLM; Buckley & Anderson, 2006; Groves, Gentile, & Groves, 2014) and the 
second is the model of helping behavior put forth by Latane and Darley (1968a). Next, I describe 
these models and briefly discuss some relevant empathic processes in order to lay the theoretical 
groundwork required to integrate the three models (GAM, GLM, and helping). 
The General Learning Model. Structurally, GLM is highly similar to GAM. For this reason, the 
following discussion of GLM is kept brief and is largely focused on the major emphases of 
GLM. Like GAM, the GLM posits a short-term cycle in which the situation and person interact 
to affect the individual’s internal state (affect, cognition, & arousal). This internal state guides 
the decision making processes, which result in an action (or decision not to act), thereby 
affecting the situation and beginning a new cycle. 
 The primary difference between the GLM and GAM involves the domain specific 
theories that are emphasized by each model. This is largely because each is focused on different 
outcomes. As pointed out by Buckley & Anderson (2006), GAM is designed to be a general 
model of aggression, and therefore explicitly incorporates theories of aggression, but its basic 
structure can be generalized to many other effects. Resulting from this line of thought, the GLM, 
focuses largely on learning effects and has been used most frequently to explain helping behavior 
(e.g., the effects of prosocial media content on prosocial behavior; Buckley & Anderson, 2006; 
Gentile et al., 2009; Greitemeyer, 2009a; Greitemeyer, 2009b). 
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 Some of the domain specific theories incorporated into GLM are very similar to GAM. 
For instance, script theory lends itself easily to non-aggression related outcomes (e.g., see 
example of restaurant behavior above). Social learning theory is also emphasized by GLM in a 
manner similar to GAM. Differences in emphasis, however, can be found in the incorporation of 
basic learning theories including habituation (Sidman, 1960), classical conditioning (Pavlov, 
1927), and operant conditioning (Skinner, 1938; Thorndike, 1911), and the explicit identification 
of the steps within the single learning cycle at which learning occurs (Gentile, Groves, Gentile, 
2014). 
 It should be noted that GLM and GAM may be best considered as two approaches from 
which to view the same general model of psychological function. For instance, it would be naïve 
to believe that fundamental learning processes such as classical and operant conditioning are 
irrelevant in the development and production of aggressive behavior. In this sense, understanding 
PA is likely to benefit from considering both models. Of course, as general models, GAM and 
GLM do not provide detailed explanations for domain specific processes regarding the prosocial 
component of PA. To this end, I turn to other theorists that have developed models dedicated 
specifically to helping behavior.  
Darley and Latané’s Model of Helping Behavior. Darley and Latane’s model of helping 
behavior (Darley & Latane, 1968a) is perhaps the most influential model of helping within the 
field of psychology. Its impact is reflected clearly by the prevalence of the model in the most 
commonly used introduction to psychology and social psychology textbooks used in classrooms 
to date (e.g., Myers & DeWall, 2015). It has also been instrumental in understanding the 
bystander intervention effect (Darley & Latane, 1968b). The model presents five steps that occur 
in any given emergency helping situation. Next, I discuss each of these steps. Since the focus of 
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this discussion is on PA behavior, the more general term “helping event” that is typically referred 
to in the model will be replaced with the term “victimization event” as this term applies more 
directly to the topic of PA behavior. 
Notice the event. The first step required for helping in any situation involves noticing the 
victimization event itself. This is perhaps the simplest step in the process of prosocial aggression 
but serves as a crucial requirement for the instigation of PA. Indeed, factors that may reduce the 
likelihood of noticing an event, such as the presence of others (Latane & Darley, 1969) or being 
in a rush (Darley & Batson, 1973). As such, one might presume that the same factors that 
influence this first step in engaging in helping behavior (e.g., the presence of crowds) may also 
operate in PA behavior. 
Interpret as an emergency (interpret the need for help). After noticing the victimization event, 
the individual must perceive that the victim is in need of help. For instance, individuals look to 
others as a source of information regarding how to interpret a situation. When those around an 
individual do not seem concerned about an event, we are more likely to interpret the event as a 
non-emergency (Darley & Latane, 1968a). Without clear cues of distress (Whitsett & Shoda, 
2014), individuals may also perceive a victimization event as a form of “rough and tumble” play, 
innocuous and good-natured teasing, a fight between friends, or simply an altercation between 
strangers. In any of these cases, PA behavior is unnecessary as there is no perceived victim to 
help. 
Decide to help (take responsibility). Next, the individual must make the decision to help the 
victim. It may be the case that the individual perceives the need for help, but does not have the 
time to assist (Darley & Batson, 1973), believe that someone else will handle the matter (Levine 
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& Crowther, 2008), or decide that helping may be too costly (and/or benefits too few; Kanekar & 
Merchant, 2001). 
Decide how to help. Once the individual has taken responsibility for helping the victim, they 
must determine how they can help. It is at this step that the individual selects the aggressive 
response (Abelson, 1976), characteristic of PA. Of course, an aggressive response, even in the 
case of victimization, is not the only behavioral option available. The individual may decide to 
wait until the episode is over and provide comfort (or another form of help) to the victim, or any 
other array of non-aggressive options (e.g., call the police). 
Act. Finally, the individual engages the behavior (which may take the form of inaction) intended 
to help the victim. The individual may yell at or scold the victimizer, place him/herself in 
between the victim and victimizer, physically restrain the victimizer, or engage any number of 
other PA-related behaviors. 
Other Empathic and Helping Related Processes. In addition to understanding the steps that 
give rise to helping behavior, discussion regarding the process of empathizing with others will 
prove valuable in understanding some of the processes that may give rise to PA. The term 
empathy has been used in a variety of ways but is defined here as “feeling a vicarious emotion 
that is congruent with but not necessarily identical to the emotion of another” (Batson, 1991; p. 
68 as cited in Stocks, Lishner, Waits, & Downum, 2011). This term is therefore distinct from 
other empathy-related emotions such as concern (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Stocks, 
Lishner, Waits, & Downum, 2011). 
 A term that is perhaps more precise is emotional contagion, described as “a tendency to 
‘catch’ (experience/express) another person’s emotions (his or her emotional appraisals, 
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subjective feelings, expressions, patterned physiological processes, action tendencies, and 
instrumental behaviors)” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992, p. 153). The “caught” emotion is 
not necessarily identical to the target’s emotion, as the individual is unable to know with absolute 
certainty what the target is feeling, but is thought to be congruent and the degree of similarity is a 
function of the individual’s empathic accuracy (Ickes, 1993). The construct is further described 
as “a complex process involving conscious perceptions and social evaluations as well as a more 
automatic, unintentional mechanism largely inaccessible to awareness” (Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 
2001, p. 110). It is this latter component, the more automatic, unintentional aspect of emotional 
contagion that is called primitive emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992; 
Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). The former term, emotional contagion, is considered a 
more deliberate and conscious phenomenon, driven by processes that can be distinct from those 
fueling the construct’s more automatic counterpart. Emotional contagion, broadly considered, is 
therefore multiply determined and theorists have posited multiple possible mechanisms. 
 For instance, hearing about the suffering of another may trigger memories of one’s own 
similar experiences and thereby the re-experiencing of those emotions. Alternatively (or 
additionally), emotional contagion can occur because of learned associations as when a 
distressed family member behaves in a way that causes distress among other family members, or 
when a source of sadness for one family member also affects another (Aronfreed, 1970). 
Stimulus generalization, in this case, then causes distress or sadness to result simply from 
observing distress or sadness in others (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992). As a quick, but 
relevant aside, other theorists have identified an additional stage in that the observation of 
another’s suffering engenders empathic distress, which is a more general negative affective state 
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(relative to emotional contagion). After causal attributions are made regarding the source of 
suffering, empathic distress is recast as empathic anger (Hoffman, 1990). 
 Among the most heavily researched causes of emotional contagion, however, is the 
automatic mimicry of movements (Bernieri, 1988), postures (Bernieri, 1988; Duclos et al., 
1989), facial expressions (Hess & Blairy, 2001; Lishner, Cooter, & Zald, 2008; Wild, Erb, Eyb, 
Bartles, & Grodd, 2003), and even vocal rhythms (Capella & Planalp, 1981). This phenomenon, 
also referred to as the chameleon effect (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), then drives empathic 
concern. 
 Empathic concern, which is also sometimes referred to as sympathy (though it also 
encompasses similar, but distinct emotions such as tenderness; Lishner, Batson, & Huss, 2011), 
is the emotional experience of concern and compassion caused by the observation of another’s 
need (Stocks, Lishner, Waits, & Downum, 2011). This concern motivates one to help with the 
ultimate goal of reducing one’s own unpleasant experience and possibly the target other’s 
experience. It should be noted that a large literature is dedicated to the investigating whether true 
altruism exists (an ultimate goal to help the other) or whether egoism (an ultimate goal to help 
the self) serves as the sole motive for helping behavior (e.g., Batson, Ackerman, Buckley, & 
Birch, 1981; Dovidio, Allen, & Shroeder, 1990; Maner et al., 2002) but such distinctions are not 
necessarily vital for a structural or functional understanding of PA. 
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CHAPTER 4.    SYNTHESIZING MODELS OF AGGRESSION AND HELPING 
 It is interesting to note that models dedicated to both helping (Darley & Latane, 1968a) 
and aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002) describe similar sequences of events in the 
production of their respective outcomes. Next, I attempt to integrate these models of aggression 
and helping. To this end, I begin with Darley and Latane’s model of helping behavior because it 
provides a simple, structured, sequence of events that describes a complete PA episode. With this 
baseline model, I incorporate aggressive processes as described by GAM, and elucidate empathic 
processes at work during the episode. Throughout, I provide a number of predictions that can be 
derived from this initial model of PA. 
The first stage of the helping model states that one must notice the event. While not 
discussed explicitly by GAM, this stage is still required for a situation variable to initiate a single 
episode cycle. In other words, without noticing the victimization event, the cycle never begins 
and help will not be provided. Therefore, factors that reduce the likelihood of noticing a 
victimization event, including crowds (Latane & Darley, 1969), being in a rush (Darley & 
Batson, 1973), or cognitive load (Lamble, Kauranen, Laakso, & Summala, 1999), should reduce 
the likelihood of PA behavior occurring. 
 In the second stage, the individual must interpret the victimization event as one in which 
the victim requires aid. Essentially a perceptual process, this stage should be influenced by a 
perceiver’s knowledge of social cues that signal victimization and a victim’s distress. Individuals 
with strong anti-bullying attitudes, for instance, may be more vigilant in identifying such 
situations as they have an enduring motivation to reduce victimization in the world. Such 
motivation may, over time, lead individuals to attend to and address victimization events with the 
hope of assisting victims and deterring victimizers. This history of attention toward such events 
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may develop an individual’s knowledge structures dedicated to identifying, and correctly 
labeling social situations characterized by victimization, and distress among victims. Of course, 
such well-developed knowledge structures can become overly accessible, leading to 
oversensitivity in identifying ambiguous situations as characterized by victimization. 
 Other non-cognitive processes are also highly relevant at this stage and while the 
cognitive components (e.g., perceptual processes) are critical to consider, they theoretically have 
downstream effects on other internal states including affect and arousal. Desensitization, for 
instance, is defined as “a reduction in emotion-related physiological reactivity” (Carnagey, 
Anderson, & Bushman, 2007) and is therefore an affective-arousal factor that should both reduce 
the likelihood that the victimization act is perceived as victimization and reduce the severity of 
response in cases which the event is perceived as victimization. Individuals who have been 
temporarily desensitized by violent media, for example, are less likely to help someone who was 
the victim of violence (Bushman & Anderson, 2009). Beliefs that aggression is normal (Möller 
& Krahé, 2009) may also reduce the likelihood of interpreting the event as one in which the 
individual requires aid as the victimizer’s behavior is less likely to be considered violating social 
norms. Although, see Martin, Brickman, & Murray, 1983 and Batson et al., 2007 for discussion 
of the relative weakness of such moral outrage in predicting helping behavior. 
Although emphasized in the decision-making stage of GAM, script theory is relevant at 
this stage as well. Script theory’s emphasis on relatively “cold” cognitive generation of potential 
action sequences betrays its critical relevance to the affective consequences of viewing a 
victimization episode.1 Specifically, scripts contain affective information that signals appropriate 
                                                          
1 Note that here, the term “affect” is used interchangeably with “emotion”. Emotion-motivation theorists (e.g., 
Batson, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992; Brehm, Miron, & Miller, 2007) typically refer to affect in valence terms (i.e., either 
positive or negative), while emotions refer to more specific affective experiences that are characterized by the 
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(or seemingly appropriate) affective reactions to a situation (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). It is a 
common social convention, for example, that the receipt of a gift is followed by the experience 
of excitement and happiness. Similarly, when observing another being victimized (particularly 
vulnerable others such as animals and children), relevant affective-motivational components of a 
script are activated (e.g., anger on behalf of the victim; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003) alongside a 
motivation to relieve the victim’s distress. As noted previously, these components are linked to 
(i.e., automatically activate) a repertoire of potential behavioral options that are evaluated during 
the reappraisal process.  
 Those who are asked to take the perspective of a victim, may be more likely to 
successfully identify the victim’s need as they would be more likely to experience empathic 
contagion. Of course, the effectiveness of perspective taking would likely depend on one’s 
ability to accurately identify the victim’s experience. Therefore, individuals lacking in empathic 
accuracy also may evidence a reduced likelihood of such an interpretation as they may be less 
likely to identify the victim’s emotional expressions as characteristic of need.   
 Stages three and four both fall neatly into GAM and GLM’s decision making processes 
stage and are therefore discussed together. The beginning of the decision making processes is 
marked by an immediate appraisal. This immediate appraisal includes affective, goal and 
intention information such as the desire for the victim to be helped.  If others are nearby, no 
response may be necessary (bystander effect) as help is “likely” to be provided and therefore no 
action is selected (Darley & Latane, 1968b). If it is clear that the observer is the sole potential 
source of assistance, they may begin generating potential action plans to execute. Script theory 
                                                          
energizing and directing of behavior. Here and elsewhere throughout the manuscript, the term affect refers to this 
latter definition. 
27 
 
indicates that the most readily available scripts in memory are likely to be selected at this stage. 
This availability may be due to a chronic accessibility (e.g., as when a parent teaches a child to 
call an authority figure in such situations) or due to a more transient activation of knowledge 
structures (i.e., priming; e.g., having recently watched a heroic display on film). At this point, the 
behavior is either enacted (an impulsive action) or if time and cognitive resources are available, 
outcome expectations are evaluated. If the predicted outcome is unsatisfying (e.g., the victim 
may be protected, but the victimizer unaffected) and important (e.g., the observer has a strong 
belief in restoring justice), reappraisal processes result in which a search for alternative views of 
the situation, relevant memories, features of the situation, and/or behavioral scripts are assessed 
until an action that meets satisfaction criteria is met. Once these criteria are met, the behavior is 
enacted. This influences the situation and triggers another single-episode cycle.  
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CHAPTER 5.    THE NEED FOR A NEW MEASURE 
 Although the social psychological literature has focused largely on explicating aggression 
and helping behavior individually, there are some notable exceptions of direct examinations of 
PA. In a series of studies, Vitaglione & Barnett (2003) developed a measure of what they call 
trait empathic anger by gauging participant’s anger reactions to a series of hypothetical events 
(e.g., I feel angry when a friend of mine is hurt by someone else). In a final study, they also used 
a pseudo-behavioral measure of PA by asking participants how likely they might be to engage in 
a series of behaviors against a drunk driver who injured another (e.g., circulate a petition to have 
the driver’s license revoked). 
 In similar research, Batson and colleagues (2007) examined empathic anger with the use 
of a ticket exchange game. In this game, the participant is told that two other participants are in 
the study and will be exchanging tickets to be entered in a raffle (in reality, there were no other 
participants). The participant was assigned to the “stable” condition in which their ticket amount 
could not change. The other participants were ostensibly assigned to the unstable condition in 
which one of them would be able to redistribute their collective tickets. The participant then 
learns that one of the participants took most of the other’s tickets. Half of the actual participants 
were also provided with perspective taking instructions designed to induce empathy on the 
victim’s behalf. The experimenters found that empathic anger occurred, but only when 
empathizing with the victim. 
 More direct research on PA comes from the evolutionary psychology literature dedicated 
to what these psychologists term “altruistic punishment” (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Krasnow, 
Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016). Paradigms in this literature use similar ticket exchange 
paradigms in which three participants (two are not real) rotate through roles in a dictator game. 
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To begin, the participant observes the “dictator player” take tickets away from a third participant. 
Next, the participant is allowed to play in the dictator role and may redistribute these tickets as 
desired. As predicted, individuals who observe this aggressive act often punish the transgressor 
by taking their tickets or redistributing them to the victim. Though this is certainly interesting, 
the majority of this research has focused on testing evolutionary predictions about norm 
violations (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fowler, 2005) and determining whether such behavior is 
truly altruistic (Fehr & Gächter, 2002, Kurzban & DeScioli, 2013; Pedersen, Kurzban, & 
McCullough, 2013). 
 Although this literature has provided valuable insight into the methodological pitfalls 
associated with measuring PA (Pedersen, Kurzban, & McCullough, 2013), it has done little to 
test the social psychological processes that give rise to PA (with the notable exception of tests of 
empathic anger and moral outrage; e.g., Batson et al., 2007). One can only speculate as to the 
reasons why PA has enjoyed so little attention in the social psychological literature. One reason 
may be the relative lack of theoretical discussion regarding the intersection between prosocial 
and aggressive behavior (and occasionally the explicit discussion of their antithetical 
relationship; Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, & Signo, 1994). In other words, it is 
difficult to test a construct without a guiding theoretical framework with which to generate 
hypotheses. A second reason may be the difficulty associated with the measurement of PA 
behavior. In short, it is challenging to convince participants of the presence of multiple other 
ostensible participants while also clearly demonstrating harm done to one of those participants 
by the other and providing an opportunity to aggress against the victimizer.  
 With this in mind, the field may benefit from the development of a tool that can be used 
to measure PA with relative ease, the use of which is guided by modern social psychological 
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theory. To this end, I conducted two experimental studies that were used to test the effectiveness 
of such a measure, as well as test some of the more basic predictions of the PA model. 
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CHAPTER 6.    OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STUDIES 
 The current set of two studies were broadly intended to validate the PA task and 
theoretical model. To this end, the studies were designed to achieve three primary goals. For the 
first experiment, the basic function of the PA measure was tested. That is, it tested whether 
behavior on the task was sensitive to changes in the presence or absence of victimization. It was 
hypothesized that when exposed to the unfair treatment of one individual by another, participants 
should be more aggressive toward this third party. 
 In addition, long-term predictions put forth previously were tested. For the sake of testing 
the most basic predictions of the model, enduring traits that are theoretically closely related to 
PA were the focus of this study. Specifically, measures of anti-bullying attitudes (Craig, 
Henderson, & Murphy, 2000) and empathic anger (Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003) were 
hypothesized to predict PA behavior. Other ancillary measures included the Big Five personality 
traits (McCrae & Costa, 1987), civic engagement (Anderson, 2014), aggressiveness (Buss & 
Perry, 1992), just world beliefs (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987; Correia & Dalbert, 2008), 
media use (Busching et al., 2015) and empathy (Davis, 1980). 
 In the second experiment, short-term experimental predictions were tested. It was 
hypothesized that a standard perspective taking empathy manipulation would increase the 
likelihood that individuals engage in PA on behalf of the target. In addition, it was hypothesized 
that participants would be sensitive to a manipulation of vulnerability of the target (Lishner, 
Batson, & Huss, 2011) such that seemingly vulnerable victims would elicit more PA behavior 
from the participant. 
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 Together, these two studies provide initial, but critical tests of the basic functions and 
predictions of the PA task and model, respectively. Of course, this work is best considered a 
series of preliminary tests designed to inspire and provide a foundation for future work regarding 
some of the more interesting theoretical and practical questions inherent in PA behavior. In 
addition to these two studies, a pilot study testing different provocation patterns was conducted 
to guide decisions regarding how aggressive the victimizer should behave in the task.  
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CHAPTER 7.    STUDY 1 OVERVIEW AND METHODS 
 This first study was designed to validate the basic functions of the PA task. The most 
fundamental function is that the task should successfully expose participants to a situation in 
which one individual is being victimized by another individual. If successful, the situation should 
stimulate aggression toward the victimizer on behalf of the victim. In contrast, aggressive 
behavior should be relatively low when there is no clear victimization demonstrated in the task. 
In other words, when the two observed individuals treat each other fairly, the participant should 
be less likely to aggress toward any one individual.  
 To this end, Study 1 manipulated the presence of victimization in the PA task. Therefore, 
a one-way (victimization: present, absent) between-subject experimental design was 
implemented. It was expected that participants would be more aggressive toward the victimizer 
than the victim in the victimization present condition but will be equally aggressive (or non-
aggressive) to both targets when victimization is not present.  
The second primary purpose of Study 1 was to assess the sensitivity of the PA task to 
some of the enduring, long-term characteristics of participants that should be theoretically related 
to PA. The current study therefore served as a cross-sectional investigation into the long-term 
processes that should foster PA behavior. Specifically: attitudes toward bullying and empathic 
anger. Both scales were hypothesized to be positively related to PA.  
 Those with strong attitudes against bullying (relative to weak attitudes) may demonstrate 
differences at multiple stages in the PA model. Those with strong anti-bullying attitudes, given 
an implied motivation to reduce bullying, may be more likely to have rich knowledge structures 
dedicated to identifying instances of victimization. Additionally, such motivations also increase 
34 
 
the likelihood that immediate appraisals (and subsequent reappraisals) will be characterized by a 
motivation to help victims. These individuals may also be more likely to attend to and think 
about instances of bullying and solutions to them. They therefore may possess more numerous, 
well-articulated scripts for assisting victims of aggression. 
Those prone to empathic anger may have more specific differences (relative to more 
globally impactful constructs, like attitudes) in the PA model. Given the specificity of the 
construct of empathic anger, its impact should be limited to the affect component of individuals’ 
internal states that feeds into decision making processes. After successful identification of a 
victimization episode, those high in empathic anger should be characterized by more extreme 
affective reactions to the event, which should strengthen the motivational components of the 
initial appraisal and subsequent reappraisals, provided the reappraisals do not significantly 
attenuate the strength of the affective response (e.g., when an individual recalls instances in 
which the current victim was a victimizer and therefore “deserves” their current treatment). Of 
course, presumably, empathic anger may be related to other constructs of interest (e.g., 
normative beliefs about aggression) that may drive activity in other processes represented by the 
PA model and therefore simple examination of the relationship between empathic anger and PA 
may not cleanly represent changes in the affective component of an observer’s internal state. 
Nonetheless, the main effect of empathic anger (in any case) should theoretically predict 
increases in PA. 
Several additional measures were also included that may explain variability in PA. Civic 
engagement is defined as “individual and collective actions designed to identify and address 
issues of public concern” (American Psychological Association, 2010) and was hypothesized to 
be positively related to PA as identifying and addressing instances of victimization is ultimately 
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(in the long run) a public concern. Just-world beliefs (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987) also 
represent a specific belief system that is particularly relevant to PA. Individuals scoring high in 
just-world beliefs were hypothesized to be more likely to ensure that the “world remains just” by 
engaging in PA. It may be the case, however, that these individuals believe that “the world” will 
eventually punish victimizers as they may be more likely to believe that “what goes around 
comes around”, regardless of their efforts. In either case, it is unlikely that these individuals will 
be less likely than others to engage in PA. The Big Five personality traits were also included, 
primarily for exploratory purposes, but also because some of the specific traits may be positively 
related to PA. Those high in conscientiousness, for instance, tend to be less aggressive (Barlett & 
Anderson, 2012; Gleason, Jensen-Campbell, & Richardson, 2004), but as individuals who are 
responsible, dependable, and orderly, they may find the social norm violations associated with 
victimization to be particularly inappropriate and therefore may be more likely to engage in PA. 
As mentioned previously, however, some research suggests that the moral outrage associated 
with norm violations may not be as influential in driving affective reactions to unfairness relative 
to the other processes that are presumably at work (e.g., empathic anger; Batson et al., 2007). 
Extraverted individuals, given their propensity toward assertiveness (though, not necessarily 
aggression; Barlett & Anderson, 2012) may be less likely to inhibit the assertive impulse 
required to engage in PA (i.e., it is typically easier not to engage in PA than to engage in PA). 
Lastly, general aggressiveness (Buss & Perry, 1992) and empathy (Davis, 1980) were 
also included, due to their clear relevance in several stages of the PA model. As mentioned 
above, some of the specific processes that contribute to general aggressiveness and empathy will 
positively predict PA (e.g., aggressive script availability, empathic concern) while other 
components may negatively predict PA (e.g., desensitization, reduced aggressive script 
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availability). Therefore, no specific predictions were made regarding these general measures 
other than the possibility that, as global constructs, both should be either unrelated, or positively 
related to PA behavior. 
Participants. The pilot study included 51 college-aged student participants, one of which 
expressed suspicions about the study’s cover story (e.g., did not believe the other participants 
were real, drew explicit connections between the surveys and task) and was therefore removed. 
For the primary study, a total of 193 college-aged students (57% female, M = 19.33, SD = 1.37) 
from a large Midwestern university participated in the study. Of these participants, 18 expressed 
suspicions. Another 11 participants expressed confusion about the study procedures (e.g., didn’t 
understand the PA task or raffle) or did not follow directions correctly (e.g., progressed through 
the survey early). After their removal, a total of 164 participants remained for data analysis. Full 
details about the removal process and other data cleaning calculations are provided in Appendix 
A. Only U.S. citizens with English as their first language were asked to participate. The study 
design was reviewed by the Institutional Review Board of the university and all participants were 
treated in accordance with APA ethics guidelines (Appendix B). 
Measures. 
The PA task and manipulation. The PA task is a program that can be run on any computer that 
has a web browser program (an internet connection is not required). There are two main phases 
to the task. First, is the instruction phase in which the research assistant explains the task. 
Second, the participant proceeds through the task itself. During the task, participants were 
assigned to the role of the observer, viewing two other participants (A and B) engage in a point 
exchange task. After each round of exchanges, the observer was able to remove points from 
either of the other two ostensible participants. During the task, half of the participants observed 
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that participant B frequently selected aggressive options, reducing the number of points that 
participant A can earn. Participant A did not retaliate and continued selecting relatively 
cooperative options throughout the game. The other half of the participants observed a relatively 
egalitarian interaction between participants A and B. The pattern of this interaction can be found 
in Appendix C. Once the task was completed, the total number of points removed from 
participant B, relative to participant A, served as the dependent variable. 
Empathic anger. Empathic anger (α = .82) Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003) is a seven-item measure 
requiring responses on a 5-point scale (Appendix D).  
Anti-bullying attitudes. Anti-bullying attitudes (α = .89) was measured with a modified vignette-
based method in which six instances of bullying are described (two verbal scenarios, two 
physical scenarios, two social exclusion scenarios; Yoon & Kerber, 2003). Individuals then 
report the perceived seriousness of the event, their likelihood of intervening, and their rating of 
the appropriateness of the behaviors of the characters in the story (Appendix E). 
Civic engagement. Civic engagement (α = .48) was measured with four items on a three-point 
scale (Appendix F; Anderson, 2014). Participants were asked to report the frequency of their 
engagement of specific civic behaviors (e.g., volunteered in one’s community). The ratings 
include whether they never engaged in a behavior (scored as a 0), engaged in the behavior, but 
not within the past 12 months (1), or engaged with the behavior within the past 12 months (2).  
Big Five personality traits. Due to the already large number of survey items, participants were 
asked to complete, a shortened version of The Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992), 
consisting of 10 items (the TIPI or Ten-Item Personality Inventory; Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann, 2003; Appendix G), will be used to measure each personality trait by asking participants 
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to rate their agreement for each item on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Because of the small number of items per trait, and the multidimensionality of the scale, 
Cronbach’s alphas were not computed for this measure. 
Just-world beliefs. Just world beliefs (α = .57) were measured with a slightly modified eight item 
scale (two additional items specifically relevant to PA were created for the current study; 
Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987; Appendix H). The scale presents several statements (e.g., I 
think basically the world is a just place) that are rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly 
agree) scale. 
General Media Habits Questionnaire. Media use was measured with the General Media Habits 
Questionnaire (Busching et al., 2015; Appendix I). It asks that participants report their three 
most-watched television shows and most-played video games. For each item, they rate how 
frequently they watch/play the media and rate the media on a number of content dimensions 
including prosocial and violent content, and whether the protagonist is a hero or villain.  
Aggressiveness. Aggressiveness was measured with the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
(BPAQ; Buss & Perry, 1992; Appendix J; α = .89). It presents 29 statements (e.g., “Some of my 
friends think I am a hothead”) which participants rate on a scale of 1 (extremely uncharacteristic 
of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me) scale. 
Empathy. Empathy was measured with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; 
Appendix K; α = .85). It presents 30 statements (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for 
people less fortunate than me”) which participants rate on a scale of 1 (does not describe me very 
well) to 5 (describes me very well). 
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Histograms presenting the frequency distributions for each of the measures and their 
subscales are provided in Appendix L. 
Procedure. Participants signed up for the study through the university SONA system for course 
credit. After arrival, the participant was greeted and led to a cubicle. They were then provided 
with an informed consent document. The consent form provided a brief overview of the cover 
story. After signing, the researcher verbally reiterated the cover story. Participants were told: “As 
you read in the consent form, this study is actually split into two separate studies. One is a survey 
study in which you’ll be filling out a number of questionnaires designed to measure various 
aspects of your personality. For the other study, the researcher’s main research interest is in 
understanding how people interact and make decisions with each other. Unfortunately, such 
research is often difficult to do because it requires that multiple participants gather in the same 
place and time. Therefore, a program has been developed that may help connect individuals 
across multiple labs located throughout the United States, making such research much easier to 
do. The purpose of that study is to test the effectiveness of this online program. The main 
function of the program is to observe how people naturally interact with each other. Because of 
this, we do not want study participants to cater their behavior to what they believe we or others 
might want them to do. For this reason, we cannot see what you or any of the other participants 
do in the program. All participant responses are encrypted and sent electronically to the 
program’s main server and your responses will not be linked to your personal information in any 
way.” 
 In order to ensure that order effects did not impact scores on the PA task or the surveys, 
the order in which participants completed either of the two studies was counterbalanced. Half of 
participants engaged in the PA task prior to completing the surveys while the other half of 
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participants completed the surveys prior to engaging in the PA task. For the sake of brevity, the 
procedure for those completing the PA task first is described. 
There were two main phases to the task, the instruction and task phase. During the 
instruction phase, the research assistant provided the participant with a brief overview of the 
task, stating that the task involves three roles: two task participants and an observer. The two 
participants engaged in a point exchange task in which each participant selected one of four point 
exchange options. These point exchange options varied in how much they benefitted each of the 
participants. There were several rounds of exchanges and the observer had the opportunity to 
remove points from either participant after each round.  
The participant was then shown the first page of the PA instruction sheet (Appendix M). 
Each of the four point exchange options were explained, and the cooperative/aggressive nature of 
each option was described. The researcher stated that if the participant selects option A, they will 
provide themselves 50 points and the other person 50 points for that round. Participants were told 
that this option is considered cooperative. For option B, the participant will provide themselves 
with 60 points and the other person with 30 points. This was considered a competitive option. 
For option C, the participant provides themselves with 40 points and the other person with 10 
points. This was considered an aggressive option. Option D provides only 40 points but grants 
the other person 60 points. This was considered a helpful option. It was decided to verbally label 
the options as cooperative, competitive, aggressive and helpful in order to make clear the 
consequences of the options to participants.  
After explaining the point exchange options, participants were then directed to the second 
page of the instructions detailing the observer’s role. Participants were told that after each round, 
the observer has one of four options that he or she must pick for each task participant. Option A 
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removes no points from the participant’s total. Option B removes 10 points from the participant’s 
total. Option C removes 25 points from the participant’s total. And lastly, option D removes 50 
points from the participant’s total. 
At this point, the participant was told that in order to ensure that participants take the task 
seriously, the total points earned at the end of the round will be translated into tickets that will be 
entered into a raffle. For every 100 points, one ticket will be entered into a raffle. Each role 
(participant A, participant B, and the observer) has its own independent raffle for a $50 gift. 
Therefore, the number of tickets earned by one participant does not influence the other 
participant’s likelihood of winning the prize. In other words, it’s in both participants’ best 
interest to cooperate in the task. This instruction was provided to ensure that participants 
understand that the harm by one participant to another is unjustified. Lastly, the participant was 
told that because the observer is not able to earn points, all observers are provided with the 
maximum possible number of points (1,200) and therefore tickets (120). This was done to ensure 
that any aggression toward a victimizer in the task was not due solely to envy on the part of the 
observer regarding the number of tickets earned by the other participants (Pedersen, Kurzban, & 
McCullough, 2013). 
Next, participants were directed to the third page of the instructions detailing the other 
components of the task screen. They were told that the bottom right portion of the screen 
contains details regarding the options selected by each participant for the most recent round, how 
many points were allocated by each participant, and what the total point earnings for that round 
were. The bottom left side of the screen displays the total points earned across all rounds. It 
shows a history of all of the option selections for all rounds played thus far. 
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Lastly, participants were shown an example task on the instruction pages four and five. 
They were told that in this example, participant A selected option A, providing themselves 50 
points and the other participant 50 points. Participant B also selected option A, bringing the total 
amount earned for each participant to be 100 thus far. The observer, in this example, then 
removed 10 points from each participant, bringing their totals earned for the current round to 90 
points. 
With the task instructions covered, the participant was asked if they had any questions or 
required clarification regarding any of the task procedures. The researcher then checked the time 
(by looking at their watch or phone) and indicated that the other labs should be ready any time 
now. They excused themselves briefly in order to communicate with the other labs and 
determine whether they were available. The researcher then closed the door, went to the main 
computer and began typing, ostensibly in order to check on the status of the other laboratories. 
After roughly one minute, the researcher returned and indicated that the other labs were ready 
and that the task can begin.  
The researcher then turned on the participant’s computer monitor, which had the task 
prepared. They told the participant “You will be randomly assigned to one of three possible roles 
and the program determines this by randomly assigning roles to the IP addresses of the 
participant computers (an image of this screen can be found in Appendix N). Therefore, we need 
to select each role until we are successfully assigned.” The researcher then selected “Player 1”, 
but a screen will pop up stating that the IP address does not match the role (Appendix O). An 
identical message will result when selecting “Player 2” but the program proceeded only after 
selecting the “Observer” button. 
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 After entering the participant’s ID number, the ostensible participants “loaded” into the 
game and the trials began. The researcher sat in on the first trial to ensure that the participant 
understood the task procedures, then stepped out, asking that the participant crack the door open 
when finished. The first trial in the task was set so both of the ostensible participants select the 
cooperative (50/50) option so no socially desirable responding PA behavior was prompted. 
When the participant completed the task and opened the door, the researcher asked that 
the participant collect their belongings before directing them to the lab next door. Here, they 
were introduced to a second research assistant. This research assistant introduced themselves 
before reiterating the cover story information regarding the “second study”, then directed the 
participant to a cubicle where they completed the surveys. Once complete, participants were 
probed for suspicion, debriefed, thanked for their time, and dismissed. 
The pilot study procedure included three steps that were described above. First, 
participants were provided with, and signed an informed consent document. Next, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three PA task conditions (high, moderate, and no 
victimization) and were given the same cover story and instructions that were used in Study 1. 
Finally, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, thanked for their time, and dismissed. 
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CHAPTER 8.    STUDY 1 RESULTS 
 All analyses were conducted using the R software package (version 3.4.3). The code that 
was used for Study 1 can be found in Appendix P. Tukey’s HSD t-tests conducted on the pilot 
study following an ANOVA (F(2,47) = 48.57, p < .001) indicated that the no provocation 
condition (n = 16, M = -29.12, SD =29.86) produced significantly lower PA scores than the 
moderate (n = 16, M = 106.25, SD =61.55, p < .001) or high (n = 16, M = 132.06, SD =56.76, p < 
.001) conditions. The high and moderate conditions, however, did not differ (p = .32). To ensure 
the clearest difference between the two conditions in Study 1, the high and no provocation 
conditions were selected. 
Before conducting analyses testing the primary hypotheses, preliminary analyses were 
conducted to evaluate participant attention/motivation lapses and to calculate the PA outcome 
measure. Participant inattention was assessed by identifying invariant responding (e.g., selecting 
five for every item in the scale), this was done by calculating the standard deviations of scale 
responses for each participant, for each scale. The procedure identified 20 participants who 
provided invariant response patterns to at least one scale. For the majority of these cases, 
individuals provided invariant responses to one or more subscale of the GMHQ. In five of these 
participants indicated that they did not play any other games or watch any other shows/movies so 
in these cases, scores of zero were imputed (to reflect these participants’ relative lack of 
violent/prosocial content exposure). In 10 cases, participants did provide a title, most often 
referring to sports-related games or shows (in which violent, or prosocial content is not 
necessarily present, at least in the eyes of a participant). For the one participants who did not 
provide a game/show/movie title, the invariant responses were retained as it was possible that 
these individuals simply forgot to type the names of the titles. Two participants provided 
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invariant responses to the IRI, one to EA and ABA, and one to JWB. The IRI, EA, ABA, and 
JWB, scales each are either multidimensional, had reverse-coded items, or did not possess a true 
neutral response option. For this reason, the responses to these scales for these cases were 
deleted. 
 Calculation of the violent and prosocial media content exposure measures was done by 
multiplying the content rating item (violent or prosocial) by the frequency of playing/viewing the 
title and summing across the three titles for each type of media (video games vs. shows/movies). 
This produced four measures of content exposure: violent video game, violent TV, prosocial 
video game, and prosocial TV content exposure scores. Those who provided no ratings for the 
video games or TV shows were assigned a 0 for their content and exposure ratings to reflect non-
exposure. 
 Next, items in the EA, ABA, BPAQ, and IRI scales were reverse coded. Items were 
identified as needing to be reverse-coded when the scale directly identified items to be reversed 
(IRI), or when visual inspection of the items clearly indicated reversing was required. 
 Calculation of the primary dependent variable measure (PA) was done by calculating a 
difference score between the number of points taken from Participant A (the victim) relative to 
Participant B (the victimizer). The difference scores were then summed across all 10 trials to 
produce the total difference in points taken from each other “participant”. Finally, for 
interpretation purposes, the PA scale was reverse coded so that higher values reflected more PA 
(more points taken from the victimizer). Negative values, therefore, indicate that more points 
were taken from the victim than the victimizer. 
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 Finally, a t-test was conducted comparing PA scores between those who completed the 
surveys first and those who completed the task first. The analysis indicated that those who did 
the task first (M = 28.61, SD = 90.78) did not statistically differ from those who took the surveys 
first (M = 22.35, SD = 88.42; t(162) = .45, p = .65, Cohen’s d = .07; see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Group differences in PA based on procedure order 
Primary analyses. First, it was imperative to test the most basic function of the task: the 
elicitation of PA when witnessing victimization. To this end, a simple t-test was conducted 
comparing the two groups. The test indicated a strong positive effect of the presence of 
victimization on PA (Cohen’s d = 2.27). Participants who were not exposed to victimization in 
the task took significantly fewer points away from the would-be “victimizer” relative to the 
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“victim” (M = -38.51, SD = 38.58), compared to participants in the victim-present condition (M 
= 97.85, SD = 73.92; Welch’s t(111) = 14.53, p < .001; test of variance equality p < .001; see 
Figure 4).2 
Figure 4. Effect of victimization on PA behavior 
 Next, relations between PA and empathic anger, as well as anti-bullying attitudes were 
assessed using simple regression analyses. Data were subset so that only participants exposed to 
the victimization episode (n = 77) were evaluated. There was no apparent relation between PA 
and EA (B = 14.01, β = .14, SE = 11.87, p = .24), nor between PA and ABA, (B = 20.19, β = .10, 
                                                          
2 A square root and log transformation were also applied to the PA measure but did not produce appreciable 
differences in results and are therefore not reported here. 
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SE = 24.39, p = .41). Thus, the current study does not provide evidence that attitudes toward 
bullying or empathic anger predict PA. 
 In addition to these primary measures of interest, simple regressions were conducted on 
each of the exploratory measures. Of the 32 outcomes (IRI and its subscales were each 
analyzed), five demonstrated significant relations: prosocial video game exposure, the 6th ABA 
narrative, agreeableness, IRI emotional contagion items, and IRI personal distress items. It is 
worth noting that a number of items demonstrated relatively impactful effect sizes (> .15) but 
lacked the power for statistical detection. Among the scales, empathy-related measures tended to 
produce somewhat larger effect sizes on average, suggesting that PA, in this version of the task, 
could be driven primarily by empathy-related processes. Of course, any interpretations of these 
items should be met with caution due to their exploratory nature, and the sheer volume of tests 
being conducted. Indeed, application of the conservative Bonferroni correction for multiple tests 
(critical value = .002), drop all tests out of the significance threshold (see Table 1; a correlation 
matrix can also be found in Table 2).  
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Table 1. Simple linear regressions among exploratory measures in Study 1 
IV B β SE t-value p 
VVGexpo .53 .19 .32 1.65 .10 
VTVexpo .33 .09 .44 .75 .45 
PVGexpo .82 .25 .37 2.20 .03* 
PTVexpo .42 .12 .40 1.06 .29 
EAmean 14.01 .14 11.87 1.18 .24 
ABAmean 20.19 .10 24.39 .83 .41 
 ABA1 -.28 -.01 3.73 -.08 .94 
 ABA2 7.08 .19 4.33 1.64 .11 
 ABA3 -2.59 -.08 3.60 -.72 .47 
 ABA4 3.15 .07 4.98 .63 .53 
 ABA5 -.37 -.01 3.38 -.11 .91 
 ABA6 11.78 .28 4.68 2.52 .01* 
Extraversion .2.00 .09 2.67 .75 .45 
Agreeableness 6.40 .23 3.18 2.01 .05* 
Conscientiousness .13 .003 4.28 .03 .98 
Emotional Stability -2.48 -.10 2.96 -.84 .41 
Openness 4.16 .11 4.22 .98 .33 
CEmean 11.58 .05 24.68 .47 .64 
JWBmean 2.92 .03 12.15 .24 .81 
JWB2mean 15.99 .18 10.32 1.55 .13 
JWB8mean 11.42 .09 14.77 .77 .44 
BPAQmean -.77 -.01 9.68 -.08 .94 
 BPAQphy -.90 -.01 7.33 -.12 .90 
 BPAQverb -10.51 -.17 6.92 -1.52 .13 
 BPAQang 3.90 .05 9.98 .39 .70 
 BPAQhost 5.85 .09 7.78 .75 .45 
IRImean 35.39 .20 19.95 1.77 .08 
 IRIfs -1.19 -.01 10.72 -.11 .91 
 IRIec 25.02 .23 12.13 2.6 .04* 
 IRIpt 3.09 .03 11.24 .28 .78 
 IRIpd 27.27 .24 12.90 2.11 .04* 
Note: Indented items refer to subscales. VVGexpo = violent video game exposure; VTVexpo = violent 
television exposure; PVGexpo = prosocial video game exposure; PTVexpo = prosocial television exposure; 
EA = empathic anger; ABA = anti-bullying attitudes; CE = civic engagement; JWB = just-world beliefs; 
JWB2 = two items within JWB created for current study purposes; JWB8 = full JWB scale including 2 new 
items; BPAQ = Buss-Perry aggression questionnaire; BPAQphy = physical aggression subscale; BPAQverb = 
verbal aggression subscale; BPAQang = anger subscale; BPAQhost = hostility subscale; IRI = interpersonal 
reactivity index; IRIfs = fantasy subscale; IRIec= empathic contagion subscale; IRIpt = perspective taking 
subscale; IRIpd = personal distress subscale. 
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Table 2. Study 1 correlation matrix 
IV 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. PA -                
2.VVGexpo .19 -               
3.VTVexpo .09 .23 -              
4.PVGexpo .25* .87 .10 -             
5.PTVexpo .12 .01 .54 -.04 -            
6.EAmean .14 -.04 -.03 .04 .06 -           
7.ABAmean .10 -.15 .06 -.16 .23* .38* -          
 8.ABA1 -.01 .01 .17 -.001 .15 .17 .66* -         
 9.ABA2 .19 .01 .04 -.02 .16 .41* .74* .51* -        
 10.ABA3 -.08 -.03 .07 -.05 .14 .22 .57* .38* .40* -       
 11.ABA4 .07 -.28 -.004 -.27* .19 .30* .56* .30* .49* .51* -      
 12.ABA5 -.01 -.19 -.01 -.22 .21 .22 .79* .41* .48* .35* .29* -     
 13.ABA6 .28* -.08 .13 -.09 .34* .40* .61* .40* .47* .22 .39* .38* -    
14.Extraversion .09 -.12 -.12 -.21 .003 .10 .14 .16 .06 .23* .12 .08 .15 -   
15.Agreeableness .23* -.12 -.10 -.10 .07 .19 .36* .18 .34* .07 .28* .27* .31* .01 -  
16.Conscientiousness .003 -.17 -.09 -.22 .13 -.01 .01 .08 -.10 .10 .24* -.06 .16 .19 .15 - 
17.Emotional Stability -.10 .03 -.04 -.01 -.08 -.19 -.15 -.03 -.12 .16 -.16 -.10 -.01 .03 .09 .39* 
18.Openness .11 .13 .17 .11 .18 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.04 -.04 -.06 -.03 .18 .16 -.16 .04 
19.CEmean .05 -.08 -.11 -.16 -.05 .14 .23 .03 .13 .25* .30* .17 .21 .29* .24* .13 
20.JWBmean .03 .06 -.12 .10 -.16 .17 .10 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.10 .13 -.06 .06 .10 .13 
21. JWB8mean .09 .06 -.09 .13 -.07 .003 .00 .08 .07 .06 .03 .13 .10 .05 .23* .18 
22. JWB2mean .18 .03 .06 .11 .21 .48* .27* .25* .32* .24* .35* .03 .42* -.02 .38* .14 
23.BPAQmean -.01 .18 .13 .20 -.05 .14 -.08 -.19 -.10 -.05 -.20 -.06 -.18 .17 -.38* -.29* 
 24.BPAQphy -.01 .26* .10 .27* -.06 .09 -.21 -.25* -.06 -.06 -.35* -.14 -.30* .13 -.36* -.29* 
 25.BPAQverb -.17 .10 .11 .02 -.08 -.01 -.09 -.10 -.46* .02 -.02 -.04 -.13 .17 -.42* .01 
 26.BPAQang .05 .16 .21 .15 -.01 .30* .11 .04 .11 .09 .05 .02 .08 .36* -.25* -.30* 
 27.BPAQhost .09 .04 .05 .13 .04 .12 .03 -.16 -.13 -.11 -.11 .00 -.09 -.01 -.21 -.26* 
28.IRImean .20 -.16 -.05 -.13 .21 .39* .52* .35* .38* .17 .47* .40* .49* .02 .42* .11 
 29.IRIfs -.01 -.03 .11 -.05 .28* .20 .09 .03 .06 .04 .15 .19 .14 .07 .09 .01 
 30.IRIec .23* -.21 -.12 -.17 .09 .41* .51* .34* .47* .13 .40* .34* .54* .10 .52* .02 
 31.IRIpt .03 -.02 .04 -.05 .13 .06 .24* .36* .10 .02 .19 .16 .26* -.11 .23 .29 
 32.IRIpd .24* -.12 -.14 -.05 -.08 .24* .39* .04 .28* .20 .32* .26 .17 -.04 .13 -.15 
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 Table 2 cont. Study 1 correlation matrix 
IV 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 
17. Emotional Stability -               
18.Openness .14 -              
19.CEmean .19 .41 -             
20.JWBmean .19 .03 .06 -            
21. JWB8mean  .17 .05 .11 .94 -           
22. JWB2mean -.04 .06 .14 .06 .41 -          
23.BPAQmean -.29* .10 -.003 -.11 -.17 -.20 -         
 24.BPAQphy -.09 .08 .002 .04 -.03 -.18 .87 -        
 25.BPAQverb -.09 .15 .03 -.05 -.13 -.25 .75 .56 -       
 26.BPAQang -.39* .13 .14 -.21 -.18 .03 .79 .57 .54 -      
 27.BPAQhost -.37* .04 -.10 -.18 -.23 -.18 .80 .54 .43 .55 -     
28.IRImean -.22 .08 .05 -.12 .05 .45 -.35 -.49 -.30 -.12 -.14 -    
 29.IRIfs -.05 .24 .06 -.10 -.04 .13 .01 -.09 .04 .08 .05 .55 -   
 30.IRIec -.27* .03 .04 -.10 .08 .47 -.37 -.47 -.38 -.05 -.19 .76 .16 -  
 31.IRIpt .12 .06 -.05 .01 .07 .19 -.44 -.42 -.22 -.38 -.37 .54 -.07 .39 - 
 32.IRIpd -.40* -.17 .05 -.08 .01 .22 .03 -.13 -.16 .11 .27 .42 .09 .24 -.17 
Note. Indented items refer to subscales. VVGexpo = violent video game exposure; VTVexpo = violent television exposure; 
PVGexpo = prosocial video game exposure; PTVexpo = prosocial television exposure; EA = empathic anger; ABA = anti-
bullying attitudes; CE = civic engagement; JWB = just-world beliefs; JWB2 = two items within JWB created for current study 
purposes; JWB8 = full JWB scale including 2 new items; BPAQ = Buss-Perry aggression questionnaire; BPAQphy = physical 
aggression subscale; BPAQverb = verbal aggression subscale; BPAQang = anger subscale; BPAQhost = hostility subscale; IRI 
= interpersonal reactivity index; IRIfs = fantasy subscale; IRIec= empathic contagion subscale; IRIpt = perspective taking 
subscale; IRIpd = personal distress subscale. 
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CHAPTER 9.    STUDY 2 OVERVIEW AND METHODS 
Study 2 was designed to test short-term processes that may theoretically occur when 
observing a victimization event. Specifically, two factors that are theoretically important in 
determining the likelihood of engaging in PA, vulnerability and empathy, were manipulated. 
The current study utilized a 2 (vulnerability: vulnerable vs. non-vulnerable) by 2 (empathy 
instructions: take perspective vs. remain objective) factorial design. 
Vulnerability is a factor that is closely related to the likelihood of engaging in helping 
behavior generally (Lishner, Batson, & Huss, 2011) and therefore theoretically PA behavior 
as well. Individuals perceived as vulnerable are more likely to be viewed as requiring help 
(Lishner, Batson, & Huss, 2011). Those not perceived as vulnerable, on the other hand, may 
be viewed as resistant to the harm caused by another’s aggressive act or more likely to 
address the injustice themselves. 
Individuals with whom we empathize are generally more likely to elicit empathic 
contagion and concern (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). Perspective taking instructions 
consistently elicit increases in helping behavior (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Cialdini, Brown, 
Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997) and the current study therefore tested the effectiveness of 
these instructions in eliciting PA as a form of helping behavior. These two factors were 
hypothesized to produce main effects on PA. No specific hypotheses were put forth regarding 
whether an additive or multiplicative interaction effect was expected. 
 In addition to the manipulations and subsequent measurement of PA, manipulation 
checks and demographic information were collected. Such checks were designed to 
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determine whether failures to manipulate empathy or vulnerability were due to ineffective or 
confusing instructions or high prevalence of failures to pay attention. 
Participants. A total of 176 college-aged students (57% female) from a large Midwestern 
university participated in the study. Of these participants, 21 expressed suspicions about the 
study’s cover story (e.g., did not believe the other participants were real, drew explicit 
connections between the essays and task). Another 8 participants expressed confusion about 
the study procedures (e.g., didn’t understand the PA task or raffle) or did not follow 
directions correctly (e.g., progressed through the survey early). After their removal, a total of 
147 participants remained for data analysis. Full details about the removal process and other 
data cleaning calculations are provided in Appendix Q. Only U.S. citizens with English as 
their first language were asked to participate. The study design was reviewed by the 
Institutional Review Board of the university and all participants were treated in accordance 
with APA ethics guidelines (Appendix R). 
Measures and manipulations  
Vulnerability manipulation. The manipulation of vulnerability has been done several ways 
including varying the musculature of males (Dijker, 2001) or portraying a story character as a 
child (Lishner, Batson, & Huss, 2011). For the needs of a current experiment, however, 
neither approach was feasible. For the current study, participants were told that they were 
randomly assigned to a “communication condition” in which they would receive a printed 
communication from a random participant in the study regarding how they deal with conflict. 
The communication, which always came from the victimized participant, read one of two 
ways.  
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For the vulnerable participant, “I’m not exactly sure what to say about how I deal 
with conflict. I think that I tend to have trouble resolving conflicts. People tell me that I need 
to stand up for myself a bit more. I just don’t want to make things worse I guess. I suppose I 
usually just try to avoid these kinds of things for the most part. Not sure what else to say 
about it.” 
For the non-vulnerable participant, “I’m not exactly sure what to say about how I deal 
with conflict. I tend not to have much trouble with conflict. When I have a problem with 
someone, I say something. For the most part I can fend for myself. Most of my conflicts, at 
least the ones I can think of, turn out OK I suppose. Not sure what else to say about it.” 
Empathy manipulation. Empathy was manipulated using standard perspective taking 
instructions. The perspective taking instructions, taken from Batson et al. (2007), were 
provided immediately before engaging in the PA task (before the task itself began, after the 
instructions were provided). 
 At this time, all participants were told “In determining our reactions to how others 
interact with each other, it has been found that the perspective we take is especially 
important. Therefore, as the observer, you will be asked to take a particular perspective 
toward the person whose note you read.” Afterward, the following sentence was randomly 
assigned to half of the participants. “While they engage with the task, try to take an objective 
perspective toward the person whose communication you read. Try not to get caught up in 
how the person feels; just remain objective and detached.” Those receiving the empathy 
manipulation instead read “While they engage with the task, try to imagine how the person 
whose communication you read feels about what is going on. Try to imagine how what 
happens in the task affects the person and how it makes them feel.” 
55 
 
Manipulation checks. In order to ensure that the manipulations were successful, participants 
were asked a number of questions regarding their perceptions of the other participants’ 
behaviors (Appendix S). 
Procedure. Participants signed up for the study through the university SONA system for 
course credit. After arrival, the participant was greeted and led to a cubicle. They were then 
provided with an informed consent form. The consent form provided a brief overview of the 
cover story. After signing, the researcher verbally reiterated the cover story, which was 
identical to that used in Study 1 with the exception that no survey study was to be conducted. 
 Next, participants were directed to a web browser containing an online survey. They 
were told “A big part of how we interact with each other is how we communicate. In order to 
better understand the role of this important component of interaction, we’re asking all of our 
participants to enter their first name and last initial on this first page, then write a paragraph 
about how they deal with conflict. This paragraph will be provided to one of the other 
participants in the study and the recipient will be randomly selected. As a reminder, your 
personal information will remain confidential and you will not be provided with identifying 
information of the other participants. With this in mind, please remember to use your last 
initial and do not write your last name in the survey as this information will be sent to one of 
the other labs.” The participant was then asked if they fully understood the instructions and if 
they had any questions. The researcher then progressed through the first page of the survey to 
reveal the page that requires the participant to write their name and a paragraph. When the 
participant completed their paragraph and selected the “next” button, a page was displayed 
thanking them for their entry, confirming that the information has been submitted to the other 
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lab, and asked them to crack the door open so the researcher could enter the passcode 
required to proceed to the next portion of the study. 
 When the participant cracked the door open, the researcher entered and told the 
participant “Okay, thank you for your entry. That information has been sent and we just need 
to determine whether the other participants have finished their entries. I’ll receive the 
passcode from them once they are finished so we can continue. Please hang on for a moment 
while I contact the other lab to determine whether they’ve finished.” The researcher then 
closed the door and returned to their desk, feigned communication by typing at the computer, 
waited approximately two minutes, then returned to the cubicle. 
 The researcher then told the participant that “The other lab participants have 
completed their entries and one of them has been sent to you. Please excuse me while I enter 
the passcode so you can see the entry. I am not supposed to see the entry, so I will enter the 
passcode and leave the cubicle. After I leave, please click next and read the response. When 
you’re finished, please click next and crack the door open.” 
After the participant opened the door, the researcher returned and introduced the PA 
task using the procedure described in Study 1. After selecting the participant’s role in the task 
but prior to entering the participant’s ID number, the researcher administered the perspective 
taking instructions. Participants then continued through the PA task as normal. Once 
finished, participants were directed to complete additional survey items that included 
manipulation checks. In order to ensure that participants understood which participant player 
the survey questions were referring to, a paper sheet with the names of the two players and 
their corresponding roles in the task was provided (Appendix T). Lastly, participants were 
probed for suspicion, debriefed, thanked for their time, and dismissed. 
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CHAPTER 10.    STUDY 2 RESULTS 
All analyses were conducted using the R software package (version 3.4.3). The code 
that was used for Study 1 can be found in Appendix U. Before conducting analyses testing 
the primary hypotheses, preliminary analyses were conducted to evaluate participant 
attention/motivation lapses. Participant inattention was assessed by identifying invariant 
responding (e.g., selecting five for every item in the scale), this was done by calculating the 
standard deviations of scale responses for each participant, for each scale. The procedure 
identified seven participants who provided invariant response patterns to at least one scale. 
Two participants provided invariant responses to Participant A’s essay evaluations, six 
participants provided invariant responses to Participant B’s task behavior measures while 
three did so for Participant A’s task behavior measure. All of the scales that had invariant 
responses were multidimensional and therefore, true neutral response options were unlikely 
in these cases and the scores for these scales were therefore deleted. Calculation of the 
primary dependent variable measure (PA) was identical to the procedure used in Study 1. 
To determine whether the PA task successfully produced differences in perceptions 
between the two computerized players, a series of pairwise t-tests were conducted on the 
relevant evaluations. The results of these pairwise tests can be found in Table 3 and illustrate 
clear perceptual differences between the two participants based on their performance in the 
task. Participants viewed the victim participant as more helpful, cooperative, and kind, and 
less aggressive or competitive than the victimizing participant. They also rated the victim as 
someone they would prefer to interact with again in a future task, believed that the victim 
deserved the gift card more than the victimizer, and believed the victimizer (more so than the 
victim) should be punished for their behavior in the task. 
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Next, to determine whether the vulnerability manipulation was effective, participant 
ratings of the essay writer’s personality were compared using t-tests and can be found in 
Table 4 below. The analyses indicated that perceptions of the target participant varied 
significantly based on the essay they read. 
 
 
Table 3. Repeated measures tests of participant perceptions of player behavior during the PA task 
 
Item Part A mean(SD) Part B mean (SD) t-value (df) p 
“During the task, this 
participant was helpful” 4.86 (1.37) 3.63 (1.35) 7.82 (140) <.001 
…Rude 2.31 (1.38) 3.70 (1.49) -9.68 (140) <.001 
…Cooperative 5.42 (1.26) 4.08 (1.54) 8.00 (140) <.001 
…Kind 4.96 (1.19) 3.76 (1.23) 8.77 (139) <.001 
…Aggressive 2.50 (1.45) 4.61 (1.68) -11.63 (140) <.001 
…Competitive 3.44 (1.63) 5.48 (1.27) -11.43 (135) <.001 
Interact again 4.83 (1.46) 4.01 (1.57) 4.61 (139) <.001 
Deserves to win 4.81 (1.49) 3.64 (1.47) 5.71 (139) <.001 
Should be punished 1.69 (1.28) 2.23 (1.50) -4.58 (140) <.001 
Note: Interact again = “If I were to do this task again, I would like to interact with this person”; Deserves to 
win = “This person deserves to win the gift card”; Should be punished = “This person should be punished 
for how they acted in the task” 
Table 4. Differences in participant perceptions of the victim participant as a function of the 
vulnerability manipulation 
 
“Based on their 
communication about 
how they deal with 
conflict, I would describe 
this person as… 
Vulnerable 
condition mean 
(SD) 
Non-Vulnerable 
condition mean 
(SD) t-value (df) p 
…Nice” 5.74 (1.07) 5.10 (1.19) -3.38 (142) .001 
…Rude 1.94 (1.01) 2.73 (1.30) 4.06 (142) <.001 
…Aloof 3.19 (1.44) 3.37 (1.43) .72 (142) .48 
…Shy 5.33 (1.41) 3.39 (1.56) -7.83 (143) <.001 
…Timid 5.18 (1.65) 3.42 (1.55) -6.57 (142) <.001 
…Assertive 2.19 (1.07) 4.38 (1.62) 9.52 (142) <.001 
…Aggressive 1.79 (1.13) 3.14 (1.49) 6.11 (143) <.001 
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Primary analyses. In order to determine whether target vulnerability or perspective taking 
caused changes in PA, a 2x2 factorial ANOVA was conducted. Results indicated that those 
who were given the vulnerable essay (M = 101.00, SD = 66.72) were no different from those 
receiving the non-vulnerable essay (M = 112.99, SD = 63.51; F(1,143) = 1.23, p = .27). In 
addition, those asked to take the perspective of the victim (M = 107.32, SD = 73.32) did not 
exhibit greater PA than those given instructions to remain objective (M = 106.47, SD = 
57.60; F(1,143) = .01, p = .94), nor was there any interaction between the two factors 
(F(1,143) = 1.45, p = .23.3 Box plots comparing these conditions are presented in figures 5 
and 6 below. 
  
                                                          
3 Interaction tests between the manipulations and gender were also conducted but there were no significant 
differences between genders, nor did gender interact with either manipulation alone or in conjunction. 
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Figure 5. Effect of vulnerability essay manipulation on PA behavior in Study 2 
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Figure 6. Effect of perspective taking instructions on PA behavior in Study 2  
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CHAPTER 11.    DISCUSSION 
The studies presented here provide initial tests of the PA task and model, focusing on 
sensitivity to victimization in the task, as well as short and long-term predictors of behavior 
within the task. While participants appeared to be sensitive to the presence of victimization, 
neither individual differences, nor the manipulations appeared to influence participants’ 
behavior on the task. There are two obvious explanations for the surprising stability of the 
PA behavior observed in these studies. First, the theoretical foundation from which the 
predictions were generated is incorrect or flawed. Given the relative simplicity of the model, 
coupled with decades of research verifying the basic components of the model (e.g., the 
bystander intervention, empathy/helping, and aggression literatures), it is possible, but 
unlikely that this would explain PA’s stability. Second, methodological characteristics 
inherent in the task itself create conditions that overwhelm both personal and other 
situational factors that would otherwise be predictive. Given the novel nature of the task, its 
complexity, and its artificiality, discussion and future research considerations focus largely 
(but not exclusively) on addressing this possibility. It’s worth noting that these two potential 
sources for the current studies’ findings are not mutually exclusive, and that failings could 
have occurred on both of these fronts. 
Theoretical considerations. Regarding long-term predictors, it was originally hypothesized 
that factors presumably closely related to PA, such as anti-bullying attitudes and empathic 
anger, would predict behavior on the task. Both of these constructs reflect fairly empathy-
laden propensities; that is, anti-bullying attitudes and empathic anger both are characterized 
by a high degree of empathy for others (r’s = .52 and .39 respectively). It may be that 
individuals high in either or both of these characteristics possess the empathic traits that also 
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suppress aggressive propensities. In this sense, high scores on the two factors, empathic 
anger, for example (which theoretically increases aggression in this situation) and trait 
empathy (which tends to predict globally reduced aggression) may essentially cancel each 
other out. One could consider replicating the analyses while controlling for trait empathy. It 
is difficult, however, to determine whether such an analysis would generate meaningful 
results given the theoretically critical role that empathy places in the role of PA behavior. In 
other words, by controlling for trait empathy, one essentially controls for a whole host of 
processes that make up the trait (e.g., emotional contagion, empathic accuracy, etc.) A more 
refined test of this possibility would involve isolating the characteristics of empathic 
processes that reduce aggression and controlling for these constructs. Such a follow-up study 
would benefit from more research in this domain that helps elucidate the components of these 
empathic constructs (both global, such as trait empathy, and specific, like empathic anger) 
that directly or indirectly suppress aggression and those that are unrelated to aggression. 
 This speculation potentially applies to the stability of PA in the experimental tests of 
short-term effects. It’s possible that those who are sensitive to perspective taking and 
vulnerability manipulations are also much less likely to aggress, producing the same 
cancellation effect. If this “competing forces” hypothesis is correct, however, it is unlikely 
that every “conflict” tested here produces a near-perfect cancellation so that the resulting 
effect size is statistically zero and not negative (over-suppression) or positive (under-
suppression). While not a rigorous test, the current findings do not lend much support to this 
hypothesis. 
 Instead, future work is likely to benefit more by considering the methodological 
features of the current procedures, and perhaps the task itself, that may be overwhelming the 
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situational and personal predictors of the behavior. It’s worth noting that a number of 
participants reported (Study 1 n = 15; Study 2 n = 15) finding the task confusing, but only at 
first. This may indicate that the cognitive resources required to understand what is occurring 
during the task may overwhelm attempts to keep in mind recently encountered information 
(e.g., how vulnerable the participant was). It may be the case that in this situation, 
participants’ cognitive load is so high that they default to simple heuristics for making 
decisions (e.g., keep it fair), rather than considering their attitudes, beliefs, values, or recently 
encountered information when making decisions. The likelihood of this possibility is 
somewhat mitigated (but still possible) by the data-cleaning procedure that identified and 
removed highly confused participants.  
 Another possibility is that the task itself presented such an unambiguous instance of 
victimization in which simple heuristics like social norms drive nearly all the variability in 
responses on the task. There are a few reasons why this possibility is one of the more likely 
contributors to PA’s stability. First, PA behavior was resilient to influence from nearly all 
short and long-term predictors. Such a global stability in PA is more likely to result from a 
single feature shared across these tests, rather than from other alternative test-specific reasons 
for the stability. Given the fairly universal social norm of maintaining fairness, unambiguity 
in the task may lend itself to a fairly mechanistic response pattern. In such a case, PA should 
be considered a step-wise process in which a punishment response occurs as a function of 
this mechanistic adherence to social norms. When it becomes unclear whether the social 
norms apply to the current situation, other internal information is consulted. Such a 
possibility suggests that introducing more ambiguity (e.g., by reducing the amount of 
victimizing that occurs) may create the conditions required for personal and situational 
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factors to influence PA. An argument could be levied that if this type of ceiling effect is 
occurring, there should be little variability in PA behavior when a victim is present. It’s quite 
possible, however, that each individual’s “ceiling” is highly personalized, in which case high 
variability in PA responses is possible while still maintaining high variability between 
participants, as was observed here. 
Methodological considerations. It’s also worth considering the prominent methodological 
similarities and differences between the current and similar measures of PA (Fehr & Gächter, 
2003; Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016). First, none of the paradigms is 
significantly simpler than the current paradigm with perhaps the exception of the raffle ticket 
component in the current approach. Instead, these studies tend to use either real money or 
real money “surrogates” that can be directly converted into money at the end of the session. 
In other words, the stakes are obvious and high in these studies, relative to the raffle tickets 
in which, regardless of performance, one is not likely to win any money. 
 These tasks also often require that the participant pay a price in order to punish the 
third party (i.e., offer some of their money). This feature may increase the likelihood that 
participants carefully consider each aggressive act, weighing whether the altruistic act is 
worth the costs and thereby prompting consideration of other aspects of the situation (e.g., 
how vulnerable the victim is). 
 Some paradigms (e.g., Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016), but not all (e.g., 
Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004; Crockett, Clark, Lieberman, Tabibnia, & Robbins, 
2010) have been conducted with multiple real participants. Nearly all current paradigms, 
however, suggest to participants that their group members are in the same building (usually 
in a nearby cubicle; Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004). This feature may remove some 
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of the artificiality of the task when experimenters speak to other participants (real or fake) 
during the procedure. 
 Interestingly, most of these paradigms require that participants rotate between roles in 
the task (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2003) or participate in both roles simultaneously (e.g., 
Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016). The participant, therefore, has had some 
degree of experience in the task from the “vulnerable” side of the table, so to speak. It may 
be that being placed within a vulnerable position in the task lends participants to better 
understand the potential distress that can occur when victimized, providing the perspective 
required to empathize with victims. 
 One issue that is of significant concern when identifying and speculating about the 
roles of these task features that differ from the current paradigm, is that the vast majority of 
investigations into PA do not evaluate short or long-term social psychological constructs 
relations with behavior in their PA tasks. Much of this literature compares methodological 
variations of paradigms (Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016; Piazza & Bering, 
2008), proximate measures of participant motivations during the task (e.g., egalitarian 
motivations; Johnson, Dawes, Fowler, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2009), or proximate measures 
of evolutionarily relevant biological mechanisms (e.g., serotonin depletion, Crockett, Clark, 
Lieberman, Tabibnia, & Robbins, 2010; reward network activation, Fehr & Rockenbach, 
2004). In short, it is unclear whether this body of literature is directly pertinent to 
determining the source of stability of PA in the current study, given the significant 
differences in the goals of the research. These methodological differences are therefore 
considered with a degree of reservation. 
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Future research. To advance the study of prosocial aggression, there are a number of 
methodological decisions that should be considered in future experimental and cross-
sectional work. First, more ambiguity should be introduced to the task. This approach also 
suggests that important covariates worth examining include perceptual processes that 
increase the likelihood of interpreting ambiguous situations as a victimization event (e.g., 
assessments of how common bullying is among the participant’s age group). 
 In addition, more time should be provided to train participants in the task. The reports 
by participants of being confused near the beginning of the task suggests that viewing the 
task in vivo was informative. Providing an automated demonstration of the task was ruled out 
of the current paradigm due to concerns that participants might be more likely to suspect that 
their participant partners were computerized. An alternative approach worth considering 
would be to video record a session with names of participants blurred so that the illusion of 
realism is maintained without communicating to participants that the task can be automated. 
In further service of this goal of clarifying the task procedures, ostensible participant 
responses could be slowed so as to give the actual participant more time to comprehend what 
is occurring in the task. 
 An additional consideration is that the participant be allowed to rotate through roles 
in the task so that they can fully grasp the potential costs of being a victim. Ironically, this 
feature in other research was criticized on the grounds that in such paradigms, PA may 
simply be a function of self-interest by enforcing cooperation norms that the participant 
would presumably benefit from in future trials (Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
2016); a criticism the current paradigm overcomes. In fact, the finding that PA occurred in 
the current paradigm suggests that PA is not simply a function of self-interest. Finally, the 
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compensation for performance in the task should be made more tangible to participants, 
potentially by providing actual cash to participants if such funding is available. 
 Research on PA from a social-psychological perspective is quite young. The findings 
observed here are not necessarily surprising, given the novelty of the paradigm being tested. 
Without a doubt, resolution of the methodological limitations in the current paradigm lends 
itself to a great deal of potential in better understanding the interactions of prosocial and 
aggressive processes. Incorporation of the suggestions above into future tests mark a 
potentially fruitful avenue of investigation. If such future tests produce similar results to 
those seen here, it should be considered evidence for some degree of inherent stability in PA 
behavior – a finding that itself, would be quite interesting.  
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APPENDIX A.  STUDY 1 DATA CLEANING PROCEDURE 
 
Raw data downloaded from Qualtrics – labeled “Groves – diss – RAW DATA – numeric – 
DL April 11, 2018_6.58” (starting N = 209; This would be considered the 1.0 document). 
Only changes made to this file were to remove the two unnecessary header rows (row 2 and 
3) 
1.1 - “Groves – diss – missing data removed 1.1” (resulting N = 193) – Sixteen cases in 
this file had no data and were therefore deleted. These cases were due to either 
technical errors (e.g., failure to enter the correct data into beginning page of survey -> 
restart survey), survey tests (e.g., experimenter entered data as a test of the survey), or 
participant no-shows (i.e., survey started, but participant did not arrive). 
 
1.2 - “Groves - diss - suspicious Ps removed 1.2.csv” (resulting N = 175) – Coding 
method (1=no suspicion whatsoever, 2 = general suspicion, 3 = specific suspicion, but 
irrelevant to study deceptions/design/hypotheses, 4= specific suspicion, potentially 
relevant to study deceptions/design/hypotheses, 5= specific suspicion related to study 
deceptions/design/hypotheses, 6= participant is aware of study deceptions and 
hypotheses; note: RAs coded these on a 0-5 scale but were recoded as 1-6 by 
Qualtrics).  
a. One case (ID: EB3HC) was identified as not having a suspicion rating, but 
research assistant described in notes that participant was not suspicious at all. 
Therefore, a suspicion score of 1 was provided. 
b. Three additional cases contained no dependent variable data and were 
removed. One case (ID: 6I8BA) was due to the procedure taking longer than 
expected and therefore ended early (outlier on survey completion time [50 
min]). The second case was identified as test data entered by the experimenter 
(no ID entered). The third case did not include a note regarding the reason for 
failure to record dependent variable data (possible experimenter error; e.g., 
forgetting to enter data). 
c. One participant was rated as a 6 as he had participated in a related study and 
knew the study hypotheses and procedures (ID: FHM7GB). 
d. Eleven participants were rated as a 5. Of these, 9 indicated they did not 
believe the other “participants” in the study were real and were therefore 
removed. The remaining two appear to have been identified as suspicious due 
to their confusion about the task and/or instructions and were kept. 
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e. Another 15 participants were recorded with suspicion ratings of 4. Of these, 
one participant indicated suspicion that the other “participants” were not real. 
One additional participant mentioned possible awareness of study hypotheses. 
The remaining removed participants drew explicit connections between the 
content on the surveys and the nature of the task or not enough information 
was provided in the note to judge suspicion with confidence.  
i. Five total removed. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Suspicion rating = 5 
ID RA note 
Removal? (1=yes, 
0=no) 
0HDXB 
The participant said he thought that the other participants were 
computers. He said he thought this from his second interaction with them. 
This may have altered his behavior in this task. Emily and Andrew A 
 
1 
FR2VXA 
She said she felt bad about taking points away, but tried to keep it fair to 
be nice in social interaction 
 
0 
F53J7A 
Thought other participants were not real. 
 
1 
F52U8A 
She didn’t think the players were real. 
 
1 
IHLAA 
Didn’t think the players were real people. Thought they were computers 
 
1 
YYPPA 
players weren’t real, camera was watching how I reacted, and thought 
you guys were trying to see if I would keep it fair. 
 
1 
01GHC 
If he didn’t think the other participants were real, it’s hard to say he had 
any genuine reactions to them. 
 
1 
M8CQA 
Thought there weren’t other real players 
 
1 
FL00JD 
During the explanation of the task she kept questioning what to do and 
why the observer would take points away or not. I told her it was 
completely up to the observer on what they wanted to do. She asked after 
I explained the IOT instructions if the players were real people. I told her 
yes and that they were from other labs across the U.S. During questions 
before debriefing, she didn’t indicate any suspicions or similar issues. 
 
0 
FZXDSC 
thought players weren’t real and we were trying to see if she’d keep it fair 
and be kinder to player 1 since player 1 was more giving of points. 
 
1 
F5XJPC 
Since she did not think the players were real she may not have acted in a 
genuine manner. Emily and Andrew A 
1 
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Table 2. Suspicion Rating = 4 
ID RA note 
Removal? 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
XQC1D 
He seemed content with the response that the other participants were real 
people and not just programs in the system. 
 
0 
91NTD 
Asked during observer instructions if there were real people or computer 
simulated people. I lied and said they were people in other labs. He 
showed no suspicion after that or during debriefing 
 
0 
4FIKC 
I gave this participant a "3" just because they brought up advantage and 
interaction, but it shouldn't have affected the results. Also, to note, my 2nd 
RA was not here (Chris knew about it anyways) - so I just ran both parts of 
the study. the participant wasn't phased. 
 
0 
DN2UA 
Kept asking why he would or would not take away points... what the point 
was. I told him it was his discretion and he could do whatever he wanted 
with taking away points or not taking away points. 
 
0 
357WC 
Thought we were seeing if he'd keep it fair or anarchy after dealing with 
the violence questionnaire he took first. 
 
1 
PWSDB 
He didn't think the people were real 
 
1 
F4FIKC 
Noticed that other players were responding quickly but did not result in 
any affect on her results. 
 
 
F1JMRB 
Although a bit ambiguous, it was directed toward a specific section of the 
study. She could not clarify what the suspicion was, just assumed 
something was amiss in the task portion of the study. 
 
0 
FCSO94 
she was suspicious but didn't seem to know what we were testing 
 
0 
F8OYUB 
She said she didn't really know what the points were for 
 
0 
FSQ5LC 
She felt as though we were being studied on how we would react to what 
each player does. 
 
0 
375DD 
thought we were trying to find the "bridge" between the task and the 
questionnaire. 
 
1 
6YWSD 
Voiced suspicion, likely had no affect on the results but was obviously 
relevant to the study. 
 
1 
FDI3CB 
Although it was relevant and could've made a difference to the study, the 
participant noted that she thought the other "individuals" in the study were 
real as she was performing the task and didn't have that suspicion until 
after the task was over. 
 
0 
HG7YB 
they way he said the people were picking answers too fast made it sound 
like he knew they weren't real 
1 
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All remaining participants were rated 3 or lower. Inspection of the experimenter notes did not 
indicate that suspicion was a problem in any remaining cases. 
1.3 - Confused and/or procedure error case removal – file: “Groves – diss – confused Ps 
removed 1.3” (resulting N = 164) 
a. An additional column was created to the right of the “Did you find any of the 
study instructions confusing?” column. Cases were coded as 1 to be removed 
if a) experimenters indicated that the participant seemed significantly 
confused about study procedures or b) study procedures were not followed as 
indicated in the confusion and suspicion notes. 
Table 3. Confused participant/procedure error removals 
ID 
“Did you find any of the 
study instructions 
confusing?” 
“Did you think that there 
was anything strange or 
unusual about the study? 
Anything we 
might not be telling 
you?” 
“Provide justification for 
your suspicion rating.” 
WVYOC 
Yes, I thought the task 
instructions were confusing. No 
He did not think there was 
anything suspicious. Emily and 
Andrew A. 
QDFTA 
yes, the task instructions 
were confusing. Would be 
better if there was a demo No 
No suspicion. Entered the 
wrong ID. Entered EV61D 
W2BUD no  no 
I think i might have 
accidentally picked the IOT 2 
instead of the IOT. he also 
said hes never done a study 
like this before so I don't think 
he was suspicious about 
anything  
FVOA7B 
Yes, the instructions for the 
task and doing the online 
task. I also did not really see 
the point in doing this task 
and how it relates to the 
study. No. 
Not suspicious about the 
questions or the study.  
FJGOB 
The task instructions. Didn't 
understand the goal of the 
task. No 
Only provided an answer of 
"No." 
FX27B Game was confusing No She did not seem to care. 
FKDZVB 
"Yes, I didn't understand the 
purpose (of the task portion 
of the study)" No 
Didn't voice any suspicions 
during or after the study. 
Participant skipped past the 
ID code section of the task 
and continued to do the task 
without notifying the 
researcher, however, during 
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b. In addition, another column was created to the right of the “Provide 
justification for your suspicion rating” column to identify cases where the 
procedure was conducted with one experimenter and not two. A total of 9 
cases were described in the notes as having been run with a single researcher. 
c. A third column was also created to identify instances where the participants 
noted confusion about the purpose of the task (not necessarily the procedure; 
usually in reference to not understanding what the observer is “supposed to 
do”). This column was created to the left of the “Did you find any of the study 
instructions confusing?” column. Participants were identified as “confused” 
(code = 1) when indicating clearly that they did not understand the purpose of 
the task. Those who indicated that they found the task “a little” or “a bit” 
the task she explained that 
she was taking points away 
from people that she deemed 
as fair.  
WVYOC 
The instructions were worded 
weirdly Game did not make sense Not suspicious 
FYYPPA 
she didn't know what to do 
during the game (she wasn't 
paying any attention) no 
didn't seem suspicious she did 
have no idea what was going 
on when the game started 
and kind of freaked out since 
she didn't know what to do. 
also she kind of tried to leave 
right away before i debriefed 
her  
FW2BUD No 
Some of the questions were 
asking weird things. I didn't 
see how they were related to 
the study 
Participant was just suspicious 
of the questions not the study 
itself. Also, when instructed 
to read and sign the consent 
form, the participant signed 
it, and turned on the monitor 
and went straight into the 
task with no instruction. I 
checked on them at about 5 
after the hour and they task 
was minimized and complete. 
I ran through the instructions, 
anyway. They also asked how 
long the task would take, so 
they seemed rushed. 
DN2UA 
yes. the task at first but the 
example cleared it up 
no NON NATIVE ENGLISH 
SPEAKER: Caroline ran it 
anyway with Chris's prior 
permission. 
Kept asking why he would or 
would not take away points... 
what the point was. I told him 
it was his discretion and he 
could do whatever he wanted 
with taking away points or not 
taking away points. 
Note. Bolded content identifies information used to mark participants for removal. 
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confusing were coded as 0. Those who indicated that the task was confusing, 
but only at first, were also coded as 0. Thirteen participants indicated some 
degree of confusion about the purpose of the task. These participants were not 
removed. 
i. Note: One case (ID: W2BUD) was identified as having potentially 
been run in the wrong condition and was therefore identified as 
“confused” for removal (rather than creating a new column for 
experimenter confusion/error). 
d. All cases listed in Table 3 were removed – information used to mark cases for 
exclusion is bolded. Eleven cases total were removed. 
1.4 – DV calculations – file name: “Groves – diss – DV calculations 1.4” (resulting N = 
164) 
a. The headers of the DV columns (HK through ID) were truncated to make 
coding easier. 
b. A second set of columns was created to include the recoded DV measure so 
that it properly reflects the points removed (0, 10, 25, or 50, instead of the 
current code of 1, 2, 3, or 4) 
i. Excel code for first case: 
=IF(HK2=1,0,IF(HK2=2,10,IF(HK2=3,25,IF(HK2=4,50,"")))).  
1. This was done because the differences between point values is 
non-linear, requiring that each response should not have equal 
weight in an aggregated analysis.  
2. After the columns were created, all cells were copied and 
pasted as text, removing the formulae) 
c. Next, the values removed from each participant were differenced for each 
round to create a metric of participants’ relative point removals for the two 
ostensible participant players. The resulting 10 columns (one for each trial) 
were created to the right of the original (raw) DV column data.  
i. Note: a column at the end of the data set “Q109 – Topics”, was also 
removed at this stage of the data cleaning procedure. 
ii. Excel code for first case, first trial: =SUM(GQ2,-GR2) 
1. Again, after the columns were created, all cells were copied 
and pasted as text. 
d. Therefore, negative values indicate that more points were taken away from 
Player 2 (the bully) than Player 1 (the victim).  
e. During this process, two participants were identified as having missing data 
on one of the participant trials (likely due to experimenter error while entering 
scores into the survey), meaning a difference score could not be calculated. 
For both of these cases, in order to retain the remaining data, scores were 
imputed to ensure that a difference score of 0 resulted.  
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i. FIHLAA – missing score for Round 8 – Player 2 
ii. TGJFB – missing score also for Round 8 – Player 2 
f. Finally, the primary DV operationalization was created by summing the ten 
columns, producing a total difference in number of points taken from Player 1 
(victim) relative to Player 2 (bully). Again, negative values indicated that 
more points were taken away from Player 2 than from Player 1. 
i. code for first case: =SUM(IE2:IN2) 
1.5 – Attention and random responding checks – file name: “Groves – diss – attention 
and random responding checks 1.5” (resulting N = 164, future files contain same N 
unless otherwise specified) 
a. Attentional and random responding were assessed by calculating the standard 
deviation for participants’ scores for each scale (i.e., within-participant 
standard deviations across items). 
i. At this stage, several column headers were truncated for readability 
purposes. 
b. The new SD columns were created following each scale, labeled as “[scale 
abbreviation] SD” 
c. The first-case code for each scale is provided below: 
i. Empathic Anger (EA SD): =STDEV(O2:U2) 
ii. Anti-Bullying Attitudes (ABA SD): =STDEV(W2:AT2) 
iii. Civic Engagement (CE SD): =STDEV(AV2:AY2) 
1. Due to the short-report nature of the measure (four items) and 
that none of the items were reverse worded, SD scores of zero 
were deemed appropriate and CE was therefore not included in 
the SD count calculation (see 1.5.e) 
iv. Big-5 Short form (B5 SD): =STDEV(BA2:BJ2) 
v. Just-World Beliefs (JWB SD): =STDEV(BA2:BJ2) 
vi. General Media Habits Questionnaire 
1. GMHQ1 SD: =IFERROR(STDEV(BY2:CG2),"") 
2. GMHQ2 SD: =IFERROR(STDEV(CJ2:CR2),"") 
3. GMHQ3 SD: =IFERROR(STDEV(CU2:DC2),"") 
4. GMHQ4 SD: =IFERROR(STDEV(DG2:DL2),"") 
5. GMHQ5 SD: =IFERROR(STDEV(DO2:DT2),"") 
6. GMHQ6 SD: =IFERROR(STDEV(DW2:EB2),"") 
a. Note: Participants reporting they did not play games 
bypassed this portion of the survey, therefore new code 
was included to remove errors in calculations resulting 
from missing values. These were automatically 
converted to missing SD calculations. 
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vii. Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ SD): 
=IFERROR(STDEV(ED2:FF2),"") 
viii. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI SD): =STDEV(FH2:GK2) 
d. Again, cells were copied and pasted as values to remove the formulae 
e. Next, a count was created of the number of SD scores that each participant 
had. Participants were not required to answer any specific question so 
individuals missing scores on individual items, but not an entire scale, were 
included in the count. 
i. A SD count for each scale was created for each participant, producing 
12 columns (after excluding Civic Engagement) containing 
dichotomous scores (indicating that the SD for that participant, for that 
measure, was or was not equal to 0). These values were summed 
across all scales for each participant [code for first case: 
=SUM(JD2:JO2)], producing a count of the number of scales that 
participant provided the same response value for every item (i.e., the 
participant likely responded mindlessly; their TOT SDc score). 
f. The data set was then sorted by TOT SDc scores, identifying a total of 20 
participants with at least one scale SD of 0. One participant had a TOT SDc 
score of 4, five participants had scores of 2, and fourteen had scores of 1. 
i. Inspection of the SD counts for each scale (collapsed across 
participants) indicated that the bulk of the TOT SDc scores came from 
GMHQ items in which participants reported not having a second or 
third most-played/watched game/show. Participants were allowed to 
skip the video game portion of the GMHQ (scales 1-3) but not the 
TV/movie portion (4-6). Inspection of the TOT SDc scores of GMHQ 
scales 4-6 indicate that several participants listed a first or second 
show but not a third, some explicitly stating that they didn’t watch 
anything else. For these reasons, participants with scale SDs of zero 
were evaluated on a case-by case basis (see Table 4). Edits were made 
to participant responses according to several a-priori decision making 
criteria: 
1. If SDs of zero identified participants who rated a GMHQ 
subscale (i.e., game/show/movie) as not existing (i.e., they do 
not play other games or watch other shows), the responses 
provided for that subscale were deleted.  
2.  If zero SD scores occurred for non-GMHQ scales, all 
responses were converted to missing values. This criterion was 
established because all of the non-GMHQ scales that had SD 
zero scores either had reversed items, multidimensionality, or 
did not include a true mid-point (i.e., no participants in this 
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data set appear to have a truly neutral score on a given scale’s 
dimension). 
3. If no note is provided regarding the GMHQ subscale, but 
ratings were provided, no assumptions were made regarding 
whether the missing information corresponded to a lack of 
content exposure (i.e., no additional shows/games than those 
listed are watched/played) or for some other reason (e.g., 
participant error in providing the title, prematurely proceeding 
through the survey before completing the previous subscale). 
Therefore, these cases were left unaltered at this stage. 
 
Table 4. Invariant responding participant removals 
ID 
TOT SDc 
score 
Scales with 
SD of zero 
Additional information 
used 
Decision Made 
 VOA7B 4 
JWB, GMHQ4-
6 
“I don't watch TV”, 
“none”, “none” 
Content exposure ratings 
deleted, JWB scores deleted 
0FOYD 2 EA ABA  EA and ABA scores deleted 
R2VXA 2 
GMHQ1, 
GMHQ3 Games/shows were listed 
Scores unaltered 
91NTD 2 GMHQ5-6 Not enough information Scores unaltered 
F2WT1D 2 GMHQ2-3 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
8UANA 2 GMHQ2-3 “None”, “None” 
Content exposure ratings 
deleted 
FS3HIA 1 IRI  IRI scores deleted 
HLIQD 1 GMHQ2 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
F3R7WC 1 GMHQ3 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
FR8SEB 1 GMHQ3 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
FLXOQA 1 GMHQ3 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
FIHLAA 1 GMHQ4 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
DEPXB 1 IRI  IRI scores deleted 
L2D8D 1 GMHQ3 “N/A” 
Content exposure ratings 
deleted 
P7HCD 1 GMHQ6 “I don't watch much TV” 
Content exposure ratings 
deleted 
ZT3AD 1 GMHQ5 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
75K0C 1 GMHQ3 “NA” 
Content exposure ratings 
deleted 
F1JRMB 1 GMHQ1 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
FL00JD 1 GMHQ5 Games/shows were listed Scores unaltered 
FJ5MYC  1 GMHQ3 “none” 
Content exposure ratings 
deleted 
Note: Bolded content identifies information used to mark participants for removal. 
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1.6 – Violent/prosocial content exposure calculations – file name: “Groves – diss – 
content exposure calculations 1.6”: file converted to SPSS format (.sav) for the rest of 
the data cleaning procedure. 
a. Before calculating content exposure scores, all variables were renamed to 
their final, analysis version.  
i. Codebook file name: “Groves - diss - Study 1 Codebook” 
b. Next, participants who indicated no game played or no movie/TV show 
watched when completing the GMHQ were assigned a score of 0 for the game 
and TV show’s exposure duration and content rating measures. This was done 
because the final GMHQ calculations require summing the contentXexposure 
items together. Therefore, providing a 0 score for the subscales allows these 
participants’ data to represent non-exposure to violent or prosocial media. 
Code:  
i. Code used:  
RECODE GMHQ1.1 GMHQ1.2 GMHQ1.3 GMHQ1.4 GMHQ1.5 
GMHQ1.6 GMHQ1.7 (SYSMIS=0). 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE GMHQ2.1 GMHQ2.2 GMHQ2.3 GMHQ2.4 GMHQ2.5 
GMHQ2.6 GMHQ2.7 (SYSMIS=0). 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE GMHQ3.1 GMHQ3.2 GMHQ3.3 GMHQ3.4 GMHQ3.5 
GMHQ3.6 GMHQ3.7 (SYSMIS=0). 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE GMHQ4.1 GMHQ4.2 GMHQ4.3 GMHQ4.4 (SYSMIS=0). 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE GMHQ5.1 GMHQ5.2 GMHQ5.3 GMHQ5.4 (SYSMIS=0). 
EXECUTE. 
 
RECODE GMHQ6.1 GMHQ6.2 GMHQ6.3 GMHQ6.4 (SYSMIS=0). 
EXECUTE. 
 
c. Finally, violent and prosocial content exposure scores were calculated for the 
two content types: 
i. Video game violent content exposure code: 
COMPUTE VVGexpo=(GMHQ1.1 * GMHQ1.2) + (GMHQ2.1 * 
GMHQ2.2) + (GMHQ3.1 * GMHQ3.2). 
EXECUTE. 
ii. TV/movie violent content exposure code: 
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COMPUTE VTVexpo=(GMHQ4.1 * GMHQ4.3) + (GMHQ5.1 * 
GMHQ5.3) + (GMHQ6.1 * GMHQ6.3). 
EXECUTE. 
iii. Video game prosocial content exposure code: 
COMPUTE PVGexpo=(GMHQ1.1 * GMHQ1.6) + (GMHQ2.1 * 
GMHQ2.6) + (GMHQ3.1 * GMHQ3.6). 
EXECUTE. 
iv. TV/movie prosocial content exposure code: 
COMPUTE PTVexpo=(GMHQ4.1 * GMHQ4.4) + (GMHQ5.1 * 
GMHQ5.4) + (GMHQ6.1 * GMHQ6.4). 
EXECUTE. 
v. At this point in time, it was discovered that a coding error occurred 
when downloading the dataset from Qualtrics. Specifically, the codes 
provided by Qualtrics pertaining to participants’ ratings of their time 
played were not correct (scores did not represent the sequential order 
of ratings provided, e.g., a score of 5 would reflect lots of time per 
week, while a score of 6 reflected very little time played per week). 
This scoring error is reflected in the printout of the full survey 
downloaded from Qualtrics titled: “Groves – diss – full Two-
study_survey”. Visual inspection of the remainder of the survey 
indicated that this was only an issue for the ratings of time spent 
playing each game or watching each movie/show. Therefore, a recode 
was conducted on each item to correct the error. The original analysis, 
creating the content-exposure items, was rerun after the recode. These 
changes were tested before implementation. The file was saved and a 
new file was created titled: “Groves – diss – content exposure 
calculations - corrected 1.6.2” 
1. Code used 
VGs: RECODE GMHQ1.1 GMHQ2.1 GMHQ3.1 
(SYSMIS=SYSMIS) (0=0) (1=1) (6=2) (7=3) (8=4) (11=5) 
(12=6) (5=7). 
EXECUTE. 
TV/movies: RECODE GMHQ4.1 GMHQ5.1 GMHQ6.1 
(SYSMIS=SYSMIS) (0=0) (1=1) (2=2) (6=3) (7=4) (8=5) 
(9=6) (10=7). 
EXECUTE. 
1.7 Reverse coding scales – file name: “Groves – diss – reverse codings 1.7” 
a. Reverse coding was conducted using the SPSS recode function, correlation 
matrices were consulted prior to and following each recode for verification 
purposes. 
b. EA item 7:  
RECODE EA7 (SYSMIS=SYSMIS) (1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1). 
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EXECUTE. 
c. ABA items 1.4, 2.4, 3.4, 4.4, 5.4, and 6.4: 
RECODE ABA1.4 ABA2.4 ABA3.4 ABA4.4 5.4 6.4 (SYSMIS=SYSMIS) 
(1=5) (2=4) (3=3) (4=2) (5=1). 
EXECUTE. 
d. Big 5 items: 
RECODE B52 B54 B56 B58 B510 (7=1) (6=2) (5=3) (4=4) (3=5) (2=6) (1=7) 
(SYSMIS=SYSMIS) INTO B52R  
  B54R B56R B58R B510R. 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE Extraver=B51+B56R. 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE Agreeable=B57+B52R. 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE Consc=B53+B58R. 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE EmoStab=B59+B54R. 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE Open=B55+B510R. 
EXECUTE. 
e. BPAQ items 7 & 18: 
RECODE BPAQ7 BPAQ18 (SYSMIS=SYSMIS) (1=7) (2=6) (3=5) (4=4) 
(5=3) (6=2) (7=1). 
EXECUTE. 
f. IRI items 3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21 
RECODE IRI3 IRI4 IRI7 IRI12 IRI13 IRI14 IRI15 IRI17 IRI19 IRI20 IRI21 
(SYSMIS=SYSMIS) (5=1) (4=2)  
  (3=3) (2=4) (1=5). 
EXECUTE. 
g. Next, scales were averaged and labeled accordingly (EAmean, ABAmean, 
etc..) 
i. EA:  
COMPUTE EAmean=mean(EA1,EA2,EA3,EA4,EA5,EA6,EA7). 
EXECUTE. 
ii. CE:  
COMPUTE CEmean=mean(CE1,CE2,CE3,CE4). 
EXECUTE. 
iii. JWB – note, two items were created for the purposes of the current 
study and added to the JWB scale. Therefore, three versions of JWB 
were created, a mean of the original items (JWBmean), one of all 
items (JWB8mean), and one of the two new items (JWB2mean).  
COMPUTE 
JWBmean=mean(JWB1,JWB2,JWB3,JWB4,JWB5,JWB6). 
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EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE 
JWB8mean=mean(JWB1,JWB2,JWB3,JWB4,JWB5,JWB6,JWB7,JW
B8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE JWB2mean=mean(JWB7,JWB8). 
EXECUTE. 
 
iv. BPAQ:  
COMPUTE 
BPAQmean=mean(BPAQ1,BPAQ2,BPAQ3,BPAQ4,BPAQ5,BPAQ6,
BPAQ7,BPAQ8,BPAQ9,BPAQ10,BPAQ11,BPAQ13,BPAQ12,BPA
Q14,BPAQ15,BPAQ16,BPAQ17,BPAQ18,BPAQ19,BPAQ20,BPAQ
21,BPAQ22,BPAQ23,BPAQ24,BPAQ25,BPAQ26,BPAQ27,BPAQ28
,BPAQ29). 
EXECUTE. 
 
v. IRI – the total mean, as well as the subscales for PT (perspective 
taking), FS (fantasy scale), EC (empathic concern), and PD (personal 
distress). 
COMPUTE 
IRImean=mean(IRI1,IRI2,IRI3,IRI5,IRI6,IRI7,IRI8,IRI9,IRI10,IRI11,
IRI12,IRI13,IRI14,IRI15,IRI16,IRI17,IRI18,IRI19,IRI20,IRI21,IRI22,
IRI23,IRI24,IRI25,IRI26,IRI27,IRI28,IRI29,IRI30). 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE 
IRImeanFS=mean(IRI1,IRI5,IRI7,IRI12,IRI16,IRI25,IRI28). 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE 
IRImeanEC=mean(IRI2,IRI4,IRI9,IRI14,IRI19,IRI22,IRI24). 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE 
IRImeanPT=mean(IRI3,IRI8,IRI15,IRI17,IRI23,IRI27,IRI30). 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE 
IRImeanPD=mean(IRI6,IRI10,IRI13,IRI18,IRI20,IRI26,IRI29). 
EXECUTE. 
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Lastly, the scale of the PA measure was reversed so that negative values reflect more 
punishment of the victim (Participant A) relative to the bully (Participant B; under column 
PA2). Note: a row with no data (row 1) after importing to SPSS was also deleted. “Groves – 
diss – study 1 – cleaned and coded”. Any additional preliminary calculations were conducted 
within R and include notes identifying them as such. 
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APPENDIX B.  STUDY 1 INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
LETTER 
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APPENDIX C.  PILOT AND STUDY 1 PARTICIPANT RESPONSE PATTERNS 
 
Table 1.  
Prosocial aggression task computerized participant response patterns in Pilot Study 
 Victimization Level 
 High Moderate Absent 
Trial 
number 
Participant 
A 
Participant 
B 
Participant 
A 
Participant 
B 
Participant 
A 
Participant 
B 
1 A A A A A A 
2 A A A A A A 
3 D B D B D A 
4 A A A C A D 
5 A B A B A A 
6 B C B A B D 
7 A C A A D B 
8 A C A C A A 
9 A C A B A A 
10 B C B B D D 
Note. Responses are as follows. A = cooperative, B = competitive, C = aggressive, D = 
helpful. 
 
 
Table 2. 
Prosocial aggression task computerized participant response patterns in Study 1 
 Victimization 
 Present Absent 
Trial 
number 
Participant A Participant B Participant A Participant B 
1 A A A A 
2 A A A A 
3 D B D A 
4 A A A D 
5 A B A A 
6 B C B D 
7 A C D B 
8 A C A A 
9 A C A A 
10 B C D D 
Note. Responses are as follows. A = cooperative, B = competitive, C = aggressive, D = 
helpful.  
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APPENDIX D.  EMPATHIC ANGER SCALE 
 
Please rate the degree to which the following statements describe you on a 1 (does not 
describe me very well) to a 5 (describes me very well) scale. 
 
If I see that someone is feeling mad because he or she was mistreated, then I feel mad too. 
When I see someone feeling sad because he or she was hurt by another person, I feel angry. 
I feel angry for other people when they have been victimized by others. 
I feel angry for a person when his or her feelings have been hurt by someone else. 
I get angry when a friend of mine is hurt by someone else. 
When someone I know gets angry at someone else, I feel angry at that person too. 
When I see others being taken advantage of, I don’t feel mad for them (R). 
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APPENDIX E.  ANTI-BULLYING ATTITUDES SCALE 
 
Verbal bullying  
1 At the writing center you hear a student chant to another child, ‘Teacher’s pet, browner, 
suck-up, kiss-ass.’ The child tries to ignore the remarks but sulks at his desk. You saw the 
same thing happen the other day.  
2 Your class is getting ready to go to lunch and the kids are in line at the door. You hear a kid 
say to another child, ‘Hey, give me your lunch money or I’ll give you a fat lip.’ The child 
complies at once. It is not the first time this has happened.  
Physical bullying 
3 A student brings a dinosaur-shaped eraser to school. He boasts that it was a prize from a 
game arcade. Another child goes over and smacks his head, demanding the eraser. The child 
refuses at first, but eventually gives in.  
4 As your kids return from music class you see a student kick another child without 
provocation. Bruising is evident. The student has been known to indulge in this type of 
behavior before.  
Social exclusion  
5 During project time you overhear a child say to another, ‘If you don’t let me have the 
purple marker I won’t invite you to my birthday party.’ It is not the first time you have heard 
the child say this type of thing.  
6 You have allowed the kids in your class to have a little free time because they’ve worked 
so hard today. You witness a kid say to another, ‘No, absolutely not. I already told you that 
you can’t play with us.’ The student is isolated and plays alone for the remaining time with 
tears in her eyes. It is not the first time this child has isolated someone from playing. 
1. How serious do you believe this event would be? 1 (not at all serious) 5 (very serious) 
2. How sympathetic would you feel toward the (victim)? 1 (not at all sympathetic) 5 
(very sympathetic) 
3. How likely would you be to intervene in this situation? 1 (not at all likely) 5 (very 
likely) 
4. How appropriate were the behaviors of the (bully) in this situation? 1 (not at all 
appropriate) 5 (very appropriate) 
Note: The (victim) text will refer to the victim child in specific to each story (e.g., the 
child who was kicked, the child told they couldn’t play with others). The (bully) text will 
refer to the bully child specific to each story (e.g., the child who demanded lunch money, 
the child who demanded the eraser). 
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APPENDIX F.  CIVIC ENGAGEMENT SCALE 
Please rate the frequency of doing the following 1 (never) 2 (have performed behavior 
but not within the last 12 months), 3 (had performed the behavior within the last 12 
months) 
1. Volunteered in my community 
2. Done something to help raise money for a charitable cause 
3. Taken part in a peaceful protest, march, or demonstration 
4. Stayed informed on current events and politics  
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APPENDIX G.  ABBREVIATED BIG FIVE PERSONALITY SCALE 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that 
statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one 
characteristic applies more strongly than the other. 
 
Disagree strongly = 1 
Disagree moderately = 2 
Disagree a little = 3 
Neither agree nor disagree = 4 
Agree a little = 5 
Agree moderately = 6 
Agree strongly = 7 
 
 
I see myself as: 
 
1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic. 
 
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome. 
 
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined. 
 
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset. 
 
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex. 
 
6. _____ Reserved, quiet. 
 
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm. 
 
8. _____ Disorganized, careless. 
 
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable. 
 
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative. 
TIPI scale scoring (‘‘R’’ denotes reverse-scored items): Extraversion: 1, 6R; Agreeableness: 
2R, 7; Conscientiousness; 3, 8R; Emotional Stability: 4R, 9; Openness to Experiences: 5, 
10R. 
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APPENDIX H.  JUST-WORLD BELIEFS SCALE 
 
Below you will find various statements. Most likely, you will strongly agree with some 
statements, and strongly disagree with others. Sometimes you may feel more neutral. Read each 
statement carefully and decide to what extent you personally agree or disagree with it. Circle the 
number which corresponds to this judgment. Make sure you circle a number for every statement. 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly 
agree 
I think basically the world if a just place 
I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve 
I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice 
I am convinced that in the long run people will be compensated for injustices 
I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g., professional, family, politics) are the exception 
rather than the rule 
I think people try to be fair when making important decisions 
I think it’s important for people to ensure that justice is served* 
I think people should step in and do something when others are treated unfairly* 
*Items developed for the purposes of the current study 
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APPENDIX I.  GENERAL MEDIA HABITS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
1. What are your three most watched television shows? 
a. Title #1:______________________________ 
 How often do you watch this show? Rarely: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How violent is this show? No violence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Extremely violent 
 How often do characters gossip, say sarcastic  
 things, tease, or insult each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do characters try to physically injure  
 each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often are people kind to each other or     
  help each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  To what degree is the main character of this show  
  considered villainous or a criminal?            Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Very much  
  To what degree is the main character of this show 
  considered a hero or saves other vulnerable   
  characters in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Very much 
 
 
b. Title #2:______________________________ 
 How often do you watch this show? Rarely: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How violent is this show? No violence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Extremely violent 
 How often do characters gossip, say sarcastic  
 things, tease, or insult each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do characters try to physically injure  
 each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often are people kind to each other or     
  help each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  To what degree is the main character of this show  
  considered villainous or a criminal?            Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Very much  
  To what degree is the main character of this show 
  considered a hero or saves other vulnerable   
  characters in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Very much 
 
c. Title #3:______________________________ 
 How often do you watch this show? Rarely: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How violent is this show? No violence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Extremely violent 
 How often do characters gossip, say sarcastic  
 things, tease, or insult each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do characters try to physically injure  
 each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often are people kind to each other or     
  help each other in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  To what degree is the main character of this show  
  considered villainous or a criminal?            Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Very much  
  To what degree is the main character of this show 
  considered a hero or saves other vulnerable   
  characters in this show? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Very much 
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2. How often do you play video games? (Mark one.) 
 Almost every day 
 About 4 or 5 times a week 
 About 2 or 3 times a week  
 About once a week    CONTINUE WITH #3 
 A couple of times a month 
 About once a month 
 Less than once a month 
 I never play video games  SKIP  
 
 
3. What are your three most played video games? 
a. Title #1:______________________________ 
 How often do you play this game? Rarely: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How violent is this game? No violence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Extremely violent 
 How often do characters gossip, say sarcastic  
 things, tease, or insult each other in this game?Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do you try to physically injure  
 creatures in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do you try to physically injure  
 players in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often are players/characters kind to each    
  other or help each other in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you help others in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you play as a villainous or criminal    
  character in this game?  Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you play as a hero or save other    
  vulnerable characters in this game?  Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 
 
b. Title #2:______________________________ 
 How often do you play this game? Rarely: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How violent is this game? No violence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Extremely violent 
 How often do characters gossip, say sarcastic  
 things, tease, or insult each other in this game?Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do you try to physically injure  
 creatures in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do you try to physically injure  
 players in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often are players/characters kind to each    
  other or help each other in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you help others in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you play as a villainous or criminal    
  character in this game?  Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you play as a hero or save other    
  vulnerable characters in this game?  Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
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c. Title #3:______________________________ 
 How often do you play this game? Rarely: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How violent is this game? No violence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :Extremely violent 
 How often do characters gossip, say sarcastic  
 things, tease, or insult each other in this game?Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do you try to physically injure  
 creatures in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
 How often do you try to physically injure  
 players in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often are players/characters kind to each    
  other or help each other in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you help others in this game? Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you play as a villainous or criminal    
  character in this game?  Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
  How often do you play as a hero or save other    
  vulnerable characters in this game?  Never: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 :All the time 
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APPENDIX J.  BUSS-PERRY AGGRESSION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Using this 5-point scale, indicate how uncharacteristic or characteristic each of the following 
statements is in describing you. 
1 = extremely uncharacteristic of me, 2 = somewhat characteristic of me, 3 = neither 
uncharacteristic nor characteristic of me, 4 = somewhat characteristic of me, 5 = extremely 
characteristic of me 
 
1. Some of my friends think I am a hothead.      
2. If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will.      
3. When people are especially nice to me, I wonder what they want.   
  
4. I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them.      
5. I have become so mad that I have broken things.      
6. I can’t help getting into arguments when people disagree with me.   
  
7. I wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things.      
8. Once in a while, I can’t control the urge to strike another person.    
  
9. I am an even-tempered person.      
10. I am suspicious of overly friendly strangers.      
11. I have threatened people I know.      
12. I flare up quickly but get over it quickly.      
13. Given enough provocation, I may hit another person.      
14. When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them.    
  
15. I am sometimes eaten up with jealousy.      
16. I can think of no good reason for ever hitting a person.      
17. At times I feel I have gotten a raw deal out of life.      
18. I have trouble controlling my temper.      
19. When frustrated, I let my irritation show.     
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20. I sometimes feel that people are laughing at me behind my back.   
  
21. I often find myself disagreeing with people.      
22. If somebody hits me, I hit back.      
23. I sometimes feel like a powder keg ready to explode.      
24. Other people always seem to get the breaks.      
25. There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows.    
  
26. I know that "friends" talk about me behind my back.      
27. My friends say that I’m somewhat argumentative.      
28. Sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason.      
29. I get into fights a little more than the average person. 
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APPENDIX K.  INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each 
item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate value on the scale at the top of 
the page: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. When you have decided on your answer, select the corresponding value. 
READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can. 
Thank you.  
ANSWER SCALE: 
Does not describe me very well = 1 
Describes me very well = 5 
 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. 
(FS) 
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC) 
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (PT) (-) 
4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. (EC) 
(-) 
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS) 
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD) 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
caught up in it. (FS) (-) 
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
(EC) 
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. (PD) 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective. (PT) 
Self Report Measures for Love and Compassion Research: Empathy 
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. (FS) (-) 
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-) 
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-) 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's arguments. (PT) (-) 
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. (FS) 
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD) 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them. (EC) (-) 
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-) 
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT) 
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
character. (FS) 
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD) 
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. (PT) 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. (FS) 
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD) 
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. (PT) 
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APPENDIX L.  STUDY 1 SCALE DISTRIBUTIONS 
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APPENDIX M.  PROSOCIAL AGGRESSION TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Interactions with Others Task (IOT) Instructions 
 
In this part of the study, you will interact with two other participants, who are in different labs. You 
will be observing a point exchange task in which you will act as an Observer. The task consists of ten 
rounds. For each round, the two players take turns selecting one of four different point exchange 
options. These options are listed below. 
 
Option A: The person gives themselves 50 points and gives their opponent 50 points. 
Option B: The person gives themselves 60 points and gives their opponent 30 points. 
Option C: The person gives themselves 40 points and gives their opponent 10 points. 
Option D: The person gives themselves 40 points and gives their opponent 60 points. 
 
The two players see four choices: A (50/50), B (60/30), C (40/10), and D (40/60). 
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After each round, you will be given the opportunity to select one of four options, which will take 
points away from Participant 1. You may also choose not to take any points away. Once you have 
made your selection for Participant 1, you can then make your selection for Participant 2. The 
available options are listed below: 
 
Option A: Take 0 points away from the participant.  
Option B: Take 10 points away from the participant.  
Option C: Take 25 points away from the participant. 
Option D: Take 50 points away from the participant. 
 
In this example, Player 1 chose option A (50/50), and Player 2 chose option A (50/50) as well. 
Now the Observer has four options which deduct different numbers of points: 
 A (-0), B (-10), C (-25), D (-50) from Participant #1. 
Once you have made your choice, click “Submit your selection” to finalize your decision. 
 
 
  
There will be a total of 10 rounds in the task. Please inform the experimenter once the task is finished. 
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Points for this Round: 
 
 
 
 On the bottom right hand side of the screen, the points for each individual round are listed. 
 The top row displays Player 1’s choice A (50/50). Since Player 1 chose option A, 50 points 
are earned and 50 points are given to the other participant. 
 The second row displays Player 2’s choice, which is choice A (50/50) as well. Player 2 
therefore earns 50 points and gives 50 points to the other participant. 
 The Round Totals, for Player 1 and Player 2, add up to 100 points each, after round one. 
 
Total Points Across All Rounds: 
 
 
 
 Displayed on the bottom left side of the screen are the Total Points Across All Rounds. In the 
first column Participant 1’s points, for the first round, are displayed. He collected 100 points 
in round one. 
 The row titled “Post 1” shows how many points the Observer deducted. In this case, the 
Observer deducted -10 points for each player.  
 “Totals” displays the total points across all rounds. The image above illustrates the totals after 
the first round.  
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Example Task: 
 
(1) 
 
The first part of the task shows Player 1’s choice. In this example, Player 1 chose option A, which 
will award himself 50 points and give 50 points to the other participant. 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Player 2’s choice is displayed. He chose option A, which will award himself 50 points and give 50 
points to the other participant. 
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(3) 
 
The Referee has now the opportunity to remove a specific amount of points from Player 1. In this 
example, the Referee chose Option B, deducting 10 points from Player 1. In the bottom left box, the 
Referee’s choice is displayed under “Post 1”, in the first column for Player 1. 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
The Referee has now the opportunity to remove a specific amount of points from Player 2. In this 
example, the Referee chose Option B, deducting 10 points from Player 2. In the bottom left box, the 
Referee choice is displayed under “Post 1”, in the second column for Player 2. 
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APPENDIX N. PROSOCIAL AGGRESSION TASK ROLE SELECTION SCREEN 
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APPENDIX O. PROSOCIAL AGGRESSION TASK IP ADDRESS SCREEN 
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APPENDIX P.  CODE USED FOR STUDY 1 ANALYSES 
#Analyses for Pilot study and Study 1 
#libraries: lm.beta effsize psych car 
 
#Pilot study tests 
Cond <- factor(GrovesDissPilot$Condition, labels=c("no provocation","moderate 
provocation","high provocation")) 
tapply(GrovesDissPilot$PA2, Cond, mean) 
tapply(GrovesDissPilot$PA2, Cond, sd) 
 
anova <- aov(PA2~Cond, dat=GrovesDissPilot) 
summary(anova) 
TukeyHSD(anova) 
 
#Reverse coding the PA measure 
CGstudy1$PA2 <- CGstudy1$PA*-1 
 
#creating subscales for the BPAQ 
CGstudy1$BPAQphy <- (BPAQ1+ BPAQ2+ BPAQ3+ BPAQ4+ BPAQ5+ BPAQ6+ 
BPAQ7+ BPAQ8+BPAQ9)/9 
CGstudy1$BPAQverb <- (BPAQ10 +BPAQ11 +BPAQ12 +BPAQ13 +BPAQ14)/5 
CGstudy1$BPAQang <- (BPAQ15 +BPAQ16 +BPAQ17 +BPAQ18 +BPAQ19 +BPAQ20 
+BPAQ21)/7 
CGstudy1$BPAQhost <- (BPAQ22 +BPAQ23 +BPAQ24 +BPAQ25 +BPAQ26 +BPAQ27 
+BPAQ28 +BPAQ29)/8 
 
#Producing histograms of measures in victim present condition 
 
hist(program1$PA2, main="Prosocial aggression \n distribution", xlab="PA score") 
hist(program1$VVGexpo, main="Violent video game exposure \n distribution", 
xlab="VVGexpo score") 
hist(program1$VTVexpo, main="Violent television exposure \n distribution", 
xlab="VTVexpo score") 
hist(program1$PVGexpo, main="Prosocial video game exposure \n distribution", 
xlab="PVGexpo score") 
hist(program1$PTVexpo, main="Prosocial television exposure \n distribution", 
xlab="PTVexpo score") 
hist(program1$EAmean, main="Empathic anger \n distribution", xlab="EA score") 
hist(program1$ABAmean, main="Antibullying attitudes \n distribution", xlab="ABA score") 
hist(program1$ABA1, main="Antibullying attitudes sit. 1 \n distribution", xlab="ABA 
situation 1 score") 
hist(program1$ABA2, main="Antibullying attitudes sit. 2 \n distribution", xlab="ABA 
situation 2 score") 
hist(program1$ABA3, main="Antibullying attitudes sit. 3 \n distribution", xlab="ABA 
situation 3 score") 
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hist(program1$ABA4, main="Antibullying attitudes sit. 4 \n distribution", xlab="ABA 
situation 4 score") 
hist(program1$ABA5, main="Antibullying attitudes sit. 5 \n distribution", xlab="ABA 
situation 5 score") 
hist(program1$ABA6, main="Antibullying attitudes sit. 6 \n distribution", xlab="ABA 
situation 6 score") 
hist(program1$CEmean, main="Civic engagement \n distribution", xlab="CEmean score") 
hist(program1$JWBmean, main="Just-world beliefs \n distribution", xlab="JWBmean 
score") 
hist(program1$JWB2mean, main="Just-world beliefs (2 new items) \n distribution", 
xlab="JWB2mean score") 
hist(program1$JWB8mean, main="Just-world beliefs (all 8 items) \n distribution", 
xlab="JWB8mean score") 
hist(program1$BPAQmean, main="Buss-Perry aggression questionnaire \n distribution", 
xlab="BPAQmean score") 
hist(program1$BPAQphy, main="BPAQ - physical \n distribution", xlab="BPAQphy score") 
hist(program1$BPAQverb, main="BPAQ - verbal \n distribution", xlab="BPAQverb score") 
hist(program1$BPAQang, main="BPAQ - anger \n distribution", xlab="BPAQang score") 
hist(program1$BPAQhost, main="BPAQ - hostility \n distribution", xlab="BPAQhost 
score") 
hist(program1$IRImean, main="Interpersonal reactivity index \n distribution", 
xlab="IRImean score") 
hist(program1$IRImeanFS, main="IRI - fantasy scale \n distribution", xlab="IRIfs score") 
hist(program1$IRImeanEC, main="IRI - empathic contagion \n distribution", xlab="IRIec 
score") 
hist(program1$IRImeanPT, main="IRI - perspective taking \n distribution", xlab="IRIpt 
score") 
hist(program1$IRImeanPD, main="IRI - personal distress \n distribution", xlab="IRIpd 
score") 
 
 
#Creating the simple regression formulae 
PVGexpolm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~PVGexpo) 
PTVexpolm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~PTVexpo) 
EAmeanlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~EAmean) 
ABAmeanlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~ABAmean) 
CEmeanlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~CEmean) 
JWBmeanlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~JWBmean) 
JWB8meanlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~JWB8mean) 
JWB2meanlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~JWB2mean) 
BPAQmeanlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~BPAQmean) 
IRImeanlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~IRImean) 
IRImeanFSlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~IRImeanFS) 
IRImeanEClm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~IRImeanEC) 
IRImeanPTlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~IRImeanPT) 
IRImeanPDlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~IRImeanPD) 
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BPAQphylm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~BPAQphy) 
BPAQverblm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~BPAQverb) 
BPAQanglm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~BPAQang) 
BPAQhostlm <- lm(data=CGstudy1, PA2~BPAQhost) 
 
PVGexpolmbeta <- lm.beta(PVGexpolm) 
PTVexpolmbeta <- lm.beta(PTVexpolm) 
EAmeanlmbeta <- lm.beta(EAmeanlm) 
ABAmeanlmbeta <- lm.beta(ABAmeanlm) 
CEmeanlmbeta <- lm.beta(CEmeanlm) 
JWBmeanlmbeta <- lm.beta(JWBmeanlm) 
JWB8meanlmbeta <- lm.beta(JWB8meanlm) 
JWB2meanlmbeta <- lm.beta(JWB2meanlm) 
BPAQmeanlmbeta <- lm.beta(BPAQmeanlm) 
IRImeanlmbeta <- lm.beta(IRImeanlm) 
IRImeanFSlmbeta <- lm.beta(IRImeanFSlm) 
IRImeanEClmbeta <- lm.beta(IRImeanEClm) 
IRImeanPTlmbeta <- lm.beta(IRImeanPTlm) 
IRImeanPDlmbeta <- lm.beta(IRImeanPDlm) 
 
BPAQphylmbeta <- lm.beta(BPAQphylm) 
BPAQverblmbeta <- lm.beta(BPAQverblm) 
BPAQanglmbeta <- lm.beta(BPAQanglm) 
BPAQhostlmbeta <- lm.beta(BPAQhostlm) 
 
summary(VVGexpolmbeta) 
summary(VTVexpolmbeta) 
summary(PVGexpolmbeta) 
summary(PTVexpolmbeta) 
summary(EAmeanlmbeta) 
summary(ABAmeanlmbeta) 
summary(CEmeanlmbeta) 
summary(JWBmeanlmbeta) 
summary(JWB8meanlmbeta) 
summary(JWB2meanlmbeta) 
summary(BPAQmeanlmbeta) 
summary(IRImeanlmbeta) 
summary(IRImeanFSlmbeta) 
summary(IRImeanEClmbeta) 
summary(IRImeanPTlmbeta) 
summary(IRImeanPDlmbeta) 
summary(BPAQphylmbeta) 
summary(BPAQverblmbeta) 
summary(BPAQanglmbeta) 
summary(BPAQhostlmbeta) 
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#program 1 (victimization present; Conditions 1 & 2) 
program1 <- subset(CGstudy1, Condition < 3) 
 
program1$BPAQphy <- (program1$BPAQ1+ program1$BPAQ2+ program1$BPAQ3+ 
program1$BPAQ4+ program1$BPAQ5+ program1$BPAQ6+ program1$BPAQ7+ 
program1$BPAQ8+program1$BPAQ9)/9 
program1$BPAQverb <- (program1$BPAQ10 +program1$BPAQ11 +program1$BPAQ12 
+program1$BPAQ13 +program1$BPAQ14)/5 
program1$BPAQang <- (program1$BPAQ15 +program1$BPAQ16 +program1$BPAQ17 
+program1$BPAQ18 +program1$BPAQ19 +program1$BPAQ20 +program1$BPAQ21)/7 
program1$BPAQhost <- (program1$BPAQ22 +program1$BPAQ23 +program1$BPAQ24 
+program1$BPAQ25 +program1$BPAQ26 +program1$BPAQ27 +program1$BPAQ28 
+program1$BPAQ29)/8 
 
program1$ABA1 <- (program1$ABA1.1+ program1$ABA1.2 +program1$ABA1.3+ 
program1$ABA1.4) 
program1$ABA2 <- (program1$ABA2.1+ program1$ABA2.2 +program1$ABA2.3+ 
program1$ABA2.4) 
program1$ABA3 <- (program1$ABA3.1+ program1$ABA3.2 +program1$ABA3.3+ 
program1$ABA3.4) 
program1$ABA4 <- (program1$ABA4.1+ program1$ABA4.2 +program1$ABA4.3+ 
program1$ABA4.4) 
program1$ABA5 <- (program1$ABA5.1+ program1$ABA5.2 +program1$ABA5.3+ 
program1$ABA5.4) 
program1$ABA6 <- (program1$ABA6.1+ program1$ABA6.2 +program1$ABA6.3+ 
program1$ABA6.4) 
 
#Constructing the models 
VVGexpolmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~VVGexpo) 
VTVexpolmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~VTVexpo) 
PVGexpolmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~PVGexpo) 
PTVexpolmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~PTVexpo) 
EAmeanlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~EAmean) 
ABAmeanlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~ABAmean) 
CEmeanlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~CEmean) 
JWBmeanlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~JWBmean) 
JWB8meanlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~JWB8mean) 
JWB2meanlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~JWB2mean) 
BPAQmeanlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~BPAQmean) 
IRImeanlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~IRImean) 
IRImeanFSlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~IRImeanFS) 
IRImeanEClmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~IRImeanEC) 
IRImeanPTlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~IRImeanPT) 
IRImeanPDlmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~IRImeanPD) 
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ABA1lmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~ABA1) 
ABA2lmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~ABA2) 
ABA3lmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~ABA3) 
ABA4lmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~ABA4) 
ABA5lmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~ABA5) 
ABA6lmC1 <- lm(data=program1, PA2~ABA6) 
BPAQphylm <- lm(data=program1, PA2~BPAQphy) 
BPAQverblm <- lm(data=program1, PA2~BPAQverb) 
BPAQanglm <- lm(data=program1, PA2~BPAQang) 
BPAQhostlm <- lm(data=program1, PA2~BPAQhost) 
 
#Converting them to lm.beta formulas in order to provide standardized betas 
VVGexpolmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(VVGexpolmC1) 
VTVexpolmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(VTVexpolmC1) 
PVGexpolmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(PVGexpolmC1) 
PTVexpolmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(PTVexpolmC1) 
EAmeanlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(EAmeanlmC1) 
ABAmeanlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(ABAmeanlmC1) 
CEmeanlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(CEmeanlmC1) 
JWBmeanlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(JWBmeanlmC1) 
JWB8meanlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(JWB8meanlmC1) 
JWB2meanlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(JWB2meanlmC1) 
BPAQmeanlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(BPAQmeanlmC1) 
IRImeanlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(IRImeanlmC1) 
IRImeanFSlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(IRImeanFSlmC1) 
IRImeanEClmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(IRImeanEClmC1) 
IRImeanPTlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(IRImeanPTlmC1) 
IRImeanPDlmC1betaC1 <- lm.beta(IRImeanPDlmC1) 
 
BPAQphylmbetaC1 <- lm.beta(BPAQphylm) 
BPAQverblmbetaC1 <- lm.beta(BPAQverblm) 
BPAQanglmbetaC1 <- lm.beta(BPAQanglm) 
BPAQhostlmbetaC1 <- lm.beta(BPAQhostlm) 
 
ABA1lmC1beta <- lm.beta(ABA1lmC1) 
ABA2lmC1beta <- lm.beta(ABA2lmC1) 
ABA3lmC1beta <- lm.beta(ABA3lmC1) 
ABA4lmC1beta <- lm.beta(ABA4lmC1) 
ABA5lmC1beta <- lm.beta(ABA5lmC1) 
ABA6lmC1beta <- lm.beta(ABA6lmC1) 
 
summary(VVGexpolmC1betaC1) 
summary(VTVexpolmC1betaC1) 
summary(PVGexpolmC1betaC1) 
summary(PTVexpolmC1betaC1) 
summary(EAmeanlmC1betaC1) 
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summary(ABAmeanlmC1betaC1) 
summary(CEmeanlmC1betaC1) 
summary(JWBmeanlmC1betaC1) 
summary(JWB8meanlmC1betaC1) 
summary(JWB2meanlmC1betaC1) 
summary(BPAQmeanlmC1betaC1) 
summary(IRImeanlmC1betaC1) 
summary(IRImeanFSlmC1betaC1) 
summary(IRImeanEClmC1betaC1) 
summary(IRImeanPTlmC1betaC1) 
summary(IRImeanPDlmC1betaC1) 
summary(BPAQphylmbetaC1) 
summary(BPAQverblmbetaC1) 
summary(BPAQanglmbetaC1) 
summary(BPAQhostlmbetaC1) 
summary(ABA1lmC1beta) 
summary(ABA2lmC1beta) 
summary(ABA3lmC1beta) 
summary(ABA4lmC1beta) 
summary(ABA5lmC1beta) 
summary(ABA6lmC1beta) 
 
#alphas 
EAscale <- data.frame(EA1, EA2, EA3, EA4, EA5, EA6, EA7) 
alpha(EAscale) 
 
ABAscale <- data.frame(ABA1.1,ABA1.2,ABA1.3,ABA1.4,ABA2.1,ABA2.2, 
            ABA2.3,ABA2.4,ABA3.1,ABA3.2,ABA3.3,ABA3.4, 
            ABA4.1,ABA4.2,ABA4.3,ABA4.4,ABA5.1,ABA5.2, 
            ABA5.3,ABA5.4,ABA6.1,ABA6.2,ABA6.3,ABA6.4) 
alpha(ABAscale) 
 
CEscale <- data.frame(CE1, CE2, CE3, CE4) 
alpha(CEscale) 
 
JWBscale <- data.frame(JWB1, JWB2, JWB3, JWB4, JWB5, JWB6) 
JWBscale8 <- data.frame(JWB1, JWB2, JWB3, JWB4, JWB5, JWB6, JWB7, JWB8) 
 
alpha(JWBscale) 
alpha(JWBscale8) 
 
BPAQscale <- data.frame(BPAQ1,BPAQ2,BPAQ3,BPAQ4,BPAQ5, 
            BPAQ6,BPAQ7,BPAQ8,BPAQ9,BPAQ10, 
            BPAQ11,BPAQ12,BPAQ13,BPAQ14,BPAQ15, 
            BPAQ16,BPAQ17,BPAQ18,BPAQ19,BPAQ20, 
            BPAQ21,BPAQ22,BPAQ23,BPAQ24,BPAQ25, 
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            BPAQ26,BPAQ27,BPAQ28,BPAQ29) 
alpha(BPAQscale) 
 
IRIscale <- data.frame(IRI1,IRI2,IRI3,IRI4,IRI5, 
            IRI6,IRI7,IRI8,IRI9,IRI10, 
            IRI11,IRI12,IRI13,IRI14,IRI15, 
            IRI16,IRI17,IRI18,IRI19,IRI20, 
            IRI21,IRI22,IRI23,IRI24,IRI25, 
            IRI26,IRI27,IRI28,IRI29,IRI30) 
alpha(IRIscale) 
 
#Creating room group assignments, means, SDs, t-test, and plot 
 
CGstudy1$roomCond <- ifelse(CGstudy1$Condition==1 | CGstudy1$Condition==3,1,0) 
tapply(PA2, CGstudy1$roomCond, mean) 
tapply(PA2, CGstudy1$roomCond, sd) 
t.test(PA2~CGstudy1$roomCond) 
roomFact <- factor(CGstudy1$roomCond, labels=c("surveys first", "task first")) 
boxplot(PA2~roomFact 
    , data=CGstudy1, xlab = "room condition", ylab="Prosocial Aggression", main="Effect of 
Room Assignment on Prosocial Aggression") 
 
#Creating victimization present/absent factor 
CGstudy1$victimPresent <- ifelse(Condition < 3, 1, 0) 
victimFactor <- factor(CGstudy1$victimPresent,  
            levels=c(0,1),labels=c("no victimization", "victimization present")) 
boxplot(PA2~victimFactor, 
    data=CGstudy1, xlab = "victimization presence condition",  
    ylab="Prosocial Aggression",  
    main="Effect of Victim Presence on Prosocial Aggression") 
#testing variance differences 
var.test(PA2~victimFactor) 
#Conducting t-test of Study 1 manipulation - Welch's used because of unequal variances 
t.test(PA2~victimFactor) 
cohen.d(PA2, victimFactor) 
#SD,means of groups, and effect size calculation 
tapply(PA2, victimFactor, mean) 
tapply(PA2, victimFactor, sd) 
 
#Plotting group differences 
boxplot(PA2~victimFactor, data=program1, xlab = "victimization condition", 
ylab="Prosocial Aggression", main="Effect of Victimization on Prosocial Aggression") 
 
#transformations 
program1$PA3 <- sqrt(program1$PA2+100) 
program1$PA3 <- log(program1$PA2+100) 
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VVGexpolmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~VVGexpo) 
VTVexpolmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~VTVexpo) 
PVGexpolmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~PVGexpo) 
PTVexpolmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~PTVexpo) 
EAmeanlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~EAmean) 
ABAmeanlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~ABAmean) 
CEmeanlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~CEmean) 
JWBmeanlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~JWBmean) 
JWB8meanlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~JWB8mean) 
JWB2meanlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~JWB2mean) 
BPAQmeanlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~BPAQmean) 
IRImeanlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~IRImean) 
IRImeanFSlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~IRImeanFS) 
IRImeanEClmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~IRImeanEC) 
IRImeanPTlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~IRImeanPT) 
IRImeanPDlmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~IRImeanPD) 
 
ABA1lmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~ABA1) 
ABA2lmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~ABA2) 
ABA3lmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~ABA3) 
ABA4lmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~ABA4) 
ABA5lmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~ABA5) 
ABA6lmC13 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~ABA6) 
 
BPAQphylm3 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~BPAQphy) 
BPAQverblm3 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~BPAQverb) 
BPAQanglm3 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~BPAQang) 
BPAQhostlm3 <- lm(data=program1, PA3~BPAQhost) 
# to lm.beta 
VVGexpolmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(VVGexpolmC13) 
VTVexpolmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(VTVexpolmC13) 
PVGexpolmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(PVGexpolmC13) 
PTVexpolmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(PTVexpolmC13) 
EAmeanlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(EAmeanlmC13) 
ABAmeanlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(ABAmeanlmC13) 
CEmeanlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(CEmeanlmC13) 
JWBmeanlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(JWBmeanlmC13) 
JWB8meanlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(JWB8meanlmC13) 
JWB2meanlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(JWB2meanlmC13) 
BPAQmeanlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(BPAQmeanlmC13) 
IRImeanlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(IRImeanlmC13) 
IRImeanFSlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(IRImeanFSlmC13) 
IRImeanEClmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(IRImeanEClmC13) 
IRImeanPTlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(IRImeanPTlmC13) 
IRImeanPDlmC1betaC13 <- lm.beta(IRImeanPDlmC13) 
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BPAQphylmbetaC13 <- lm.beta(BPAQphylm3) 
BPAQverblmbetaC13 <- lm.beta(BPAQverblm3) 
BPAQanglmbetaC13 <- lm.beta(BPAQanglm3) 
BPAQhostlmbetaC13 <- lm.beta(BPAQhostlm3) 
 
ABA1lmC1beta3 <- lm.beta(ABA1lmC13) 
ABA2lmC1beta3 <- lm.beta(ABA2lmC13) 
ABA3lmC1beta3 <- lm.beta(ABA3lmC13) 
ABA4lmC1beta3 <- lm.beta(ABA4lmC13) 
ABA5lmC1beta3 <- lm.beta(ABA5lmC13) 
ABA6lmC1beta3 <- lm.beta(ABA6lmC13) 
 
summary(VVGexpolmC1betaC13) 
summary(VTVexpolmC1betaC13) 
summary(PVGexpolmC1betaC13) 
summary(PTVexpolmC1betaC13) 
summary(EAmeanlmC1betaC13) 
summary(ABAmeanlmC1betaC13) 
summary(CEmeanlmC1betaC13) 
summary(JWBmeanlmC1betaC13) 
summary(JWB8meanlmC1betaC13) 
summary(JWB2meanlmC1betaC13) 
summary(BPAQmeanlmC1betaC13) 
summary(IRImeanlmC1betaC13) 
summary(IRImeanFSlmC1betaC13) 
summary(IRImeanEClmC1betaC13) 
summary(IRImeanPTlmC1betaC13) 
summary(IRImeanPDlmC1betaC13) 
 
summary(BPAQphylmbetaC13) 
summary(BPAQverblmbetaC13) 
summary(BPAQanglmbetaC13) 
summary(BPAQhostlmbetaC13) 
 
summary(ABA1lmC1beta3) 
summary(ABA2lmC1beta3) 
summary(ABA3lmC1beta3) 
summary(ABA4lmC1beta3) 
summary(ABA5lmC1beta3) 
summary(ABA6lmC1beta3) 
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APPENDIX Q.  STUDY 2 DATA CLEANING PROCEDURE 
Raw data downloaded from Qualtrics – labeled “Groves - diss - RAW DATA - numeric - 
Communications study_June 3, 2018_20.18” (starting N = 222; This would be considered the 
1.0 document). Only changes made to this file were to remove the two unnecessary header 
rows (row 2 and 3). The procedure for cleaning Study 2’s data was identical to Study 1.  
1.1  – “Groves – diss2 - missing data removed 1.1” (resulting N = 176) – Forty-six cases 
in this file had no data and were therefore deleted. These cases were due to either 
technical errors (e.g., failure to enter the correct data into beginning page of survey -> 
restart survey), survey tests (e.g., experimenter entered data as a test of the survey), or 
participant no-shows (i.e., survey started, but participant did not arrive). 
a. Total of 46 removed 
 
1.2 – “Groves – diss2 – suspicious Ps removed 1.2” (resulting N = 155) 
 
a. Twenty participants were rated with suspicion scores of 5. Of these, 19 
indicated they did not believe the other “participants” in the study were real 
and were therefore removed. 
Table 1. Suspicion rating = 5 
ID RA note 
Removal? (1=yes, 
0=no) 
990QA 
Didn't think the players were real.  
1 
F5XJQB She thought the players weren't real and that the whole thing was 
simulated. 
1 
2CRSA 
Didn't believe the other participants were real 
1 
XQCIB 
Thought players weren't real. 
1 
FQTVA 
He did not think the participants were real 
1 
F05GZB While not specifically saying what about the supposed person, I think 
it's still relevant as her responses would then but unnatural. 
1 
FK72EA 
The participant did not think that the other participants were real. 
1 
FEG40B She brought up how she didn't think the participants were real in the 
study and it was just designed to look that way.  
1 
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b. Another 8 participants were recorded with suspicion ratings of 4. Of these, 
two participants indicated suspecting that the other players were computer 
controlled and were removed. 
c. A remaining 3 participants were given suspicion ratings of 3. Inspection of the 
experimenter notes did not indicate that suspicion was a problem in any 
remaining cases. 
i. Total of 21 participants removed. 
 
 
 
 
FVBYIB Thought something was a little weird but couldn't pinpoint anything 
specific 
0 
374DB Participant admitted to not interacting as observer in a genuine manner, 
did not register that other participants could be real.  
1 
SX8RB 
he didn't think the people were real. Also half way through the study he 
had to go to the bathroom really bad so I let him leave and come back 
for a few mins.  
1 
FQI4BA If she thought the people weren't real, she likely didn't take the task 
seriously. 
1 
Q2VXA 
Definitely thought players were computers 
1 
7DM5B 
Thought that the other participants might not be real. 
1 
L8CPA 
Thought they were robots 
1 
FKOMUA 
Yes, thought that there weren't actually other people. If the participant 
didn't think she was interacting with real people then her responses 
were not genuine. 
1 
FT96QA 
Thought the other participants were not real 
1 
FGAKRA 
She indicated that the other participants in the study were not real 
because she just had a suspicion that they weren't. She also said that 
the more she participates in psychology studies, the more she distrusts 
that the deception / condition is "real". 
1 
2QIWA Yes, she didn't think there were other people interacting, all fake. I 
think this would have affect her responses because if you don't think 
the interaction is real, you might respond differently than if it was 
1 
131 
 
 
 
1.3 – “Groves – diss2 – confused Ps removed 1.3” (resulting N = 147) 
a. A column was created to the right of the “Did you find any of the study 
instructions confusing?” column. Cases were coded as 1 to be removed if a) 
experimenters indicated that the participant seemed significantly confused 
about study procedures or b) study procedures were not followed as indicated 
in the confusion and suspicion notes. 
Table 2. Suspicion Rating = 4 
ID RA note 
Removal? 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
F2E57A 
She suspected a player was a computer since it never responded when the 
other player was "aggressive" towards it. 
1 
FOM1HA 
She felt like Julie was influenced by an outside source so that is why she 
started to not cooperate. It relates to Julie's choices, but I don't think the 
participant made the decisions she did based on Julie's situation. 
0 
F9419B 
Thought she was supposed to react towards a certain participant but didn't 
give any indication that she thought the other players weren't real 
0 
EV50B thought maybe we were measuring reaction to levels of competitiveness  0 
FY924A 
Participant felt as though maybe it was computer controlled, that the 
participants had already done it and that's why the choices were coming in so 
fast, or that the other players wanted to get done quickly, so she didn't really 
pay much attention to her choices, but rather just rushed through it. 
1 
MVDDA 
Questioned the purpose of the task. Also did not want responses to be wrote 
down. 
0 
2J4PB 
They talked about how the perspective we take and the response we read had 
something to do with our interaction - didn't give it that much thought though 
0 
F0M3FB 
I don't think her being the observer did affect the results. I mean she thought it 
was meant for her to be in that condition, but she did continue to think the 
other participants were real. That being said, she may have figured out her 
position wasn't random, but she definitely did the task correctly for condition 
B and probably didn't change her responses or behavior because of that. She 
also said she tried her best to keep them even, used terms like "aggressive 
one" and "cooperative one" 
0 
Table 3. Confused participant/procedure error removals 
ID 
“Did you find any 
of the study 
instructions 
confusing?” 
“Did you think that there was 
anything strange or 
unusual about the study? 
Anything we 
might not be telling you?” 
“Provide justification for 
your suspicion rating.” 
EV50B 
Yes, the survey. ( He 
accidentally took it 
before the task) 
thought maybe we were 
measuring reaction to levels of 
competitiveness  
thought maybe we were 
measuring reaction to levels of 
competitiveness  
OPUVA 
Confused about the 
point system 
General suspicion about the 
study 
Generally suspicious since it 
was a psych study. Nothing 
specific though 
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b. An additional column “TaskUnclear”, was created to identify instances where 
the participants noted confusion about the purpose of the task (not necessarily 
the procedure; usually in reference to not understanding what the observer is 
“supposed to do”). This column was created to the left of the “Did you find 
any of the study instructions confusing?” column. Participants were identified 
as “confused” (code = 1) when indicating clearly that they did not understand 
the purpose of the task. Those who indicated that they found the task “a little” 
or “a bit” confusing were coded as 0. Those who indicated that the task was 
confusing, but only at first, were also coded as 0. Thirteen participants 
indicated some degree of confusion about the purpose of the task. These 
participants were not removed. 
c. All cases listed in Table 3 were removed – information used to mark cases for 
exclusion is bolded.  
i. Eight cases total were removed. 
IHKAA 
Forgot whose note 
he read No Not suspicious at all 
FW6CDA 
The task instructions 
were confusing, too 
many choices. No. 
She didn't seem to care what 
was going on, she seem like she 
was in a hurry. Also the survey 
still continued to the questions 
about the interaction with the 
other participants without 
stopping. And she filled that 
portion out before doing the 
task. 
FI49MA 
The task instructions 
were confusing. I don't, no 
Didn't give any reason to be 
suspicious. No reaction or 
stating that something was 
strange. 
FVBYIB 
Did not understand 
the game at all. no 
No suspicion. They said that 
they had just randomly 
deducted points because, they 
didn't understand the task. 
4NUQB 
he didn't understand 
the purpose of the 
raffle  no He didn't seem suspicious  
F8JCEB 
Kind of, did not really 
understand the task 
instructions and 
thought it was 
worded in a weird 
way No No suspicion 
Note: Bolded content identifies information used to mark participants for removal. 
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1.4 – “Groves – diss2 – DV calculations 1.4” (resulting N = 147; future files contain 
same N unless otherwise specified) 
a. The headers of the DV columns (BZ through CS) were truncated to make 
coding easier. 
b. A second set of columns was created to include the recoded DV measure so 
that it properly reflects the points removed (0, 10, 25, or 50, instead of the 
current code of 1, 2, 3, or 4) 
i. Excel code for first case: 
=IF(BZ2=1,0,IF(BZ2=2,10,IF(BZ2=3,25,IF(BZ2=4,50,"")))).  
1. This was done because the differences between point values is 
non-linear, requiring that each response should not have equal 
weight in an aggregated analysis.  
2. After the columns were created, all cells were copied and 
pasted as text, removing the formulae) 
c. Next, the values removed from each participant were differenced for each 
round to create a metric of participants’ relative point removals for the two 
ostensible participant players. The resulting 10 columns (one for each trial) 
were created to the right of the original (raw) DV column data.  
i. Excel code for first case, first trial: =SUM(GQ2,-GR2) 
ii. Again, after the columns were created, all cells were copied and pasted 
as text. 
d. Finally, the primary DV operationalization was created by summing the ten 
columns, producing a total difference in number of points taken from Player 1 
(victim) relative to Player 2 (bully). Again, negative values indicated that 
more points were taken away from Player 2 than from Player 1. 
i. code for first case: =SUM(IE2:IN2) 
1.5 – “Groves – diss2 – IV calculations 1.5” 
a. Four columns were provided by Qualtrics that identified participant essay 
conditions and needed to be condensed. A new column was created summing 
the four columns, this column was then used to calculate the vulnerability 
condition (current code: female vulnerable = 1, female non-vulnerable = 2, 
male vulnerable = 3, male non-vulnerable = 4; recoded so vulnerable = 1 and 
non-vulnerable = 0). 
i. Summing column code: =SUM(AA2:AE2) 
ii. Recode code: =IF(AE2=4,0,IF(AE2=2,0,1)) 
b. Next, all variables were renamed to their final, analysis version.  
i. Codebook file name: “Groves - diss - Study 2 Codebook” 
c. Next, the two columns currently identifying participant conditions (PerspCond 
and VulnCond) were combined into a 4-level IV column. This was done by 
creating 4 columns corresponding to each condition and then summing them. 
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i. Cond1: =IF(AND(AA2=1,AK2=1),1,"") 
ii. Cond2: =IF(AND(AA2=1,AK2=0),2,"") 
iii. Cond3: =IF(AND(AA2=2,AK2=1),3,"") 
iv. Cond4: =IF(AND(AA2=2,AK2=0),4,"") 
v. Condition: =SUM(W2:Z2) 
vi. Therefore the condition values correspond to the following: 
1. = take other’s perspective & target vulnerable 
2. = take other’s perspective & target non-vulnerable 
3. = take objective perspective & target vulnerable 
4. = take objective perspective & target non-vulnerable 
1.6 – “Groves – diss2 – random responding checks 1.6” 
a. Attentional and random responding were assessed by calculating the standard 
deviation for participants’ scores for each scale (i.e., within-participant 
standard deviations across items). 
b. Two participants, (IDs: 5AV5B and F9KYZA) provided no responses for the 
Participant A essay ratings, producing an error when calculating their SD. 
Therefore, a score of 0 was imputed for these cases. 
i. Note: Participants were able to complete items pertaining to 
Participant B’s essay, but no participants actually read Participant B’s 
essay. Therefore, a SD score was not calculated for this scale.  
c. As in Study 1, a TOT SDc score was calculated, providing a count of the 
number of scales (Participant A’s task behavior, Participant B’s task behavior, 
and Participant A’s essay ratings) with standard deviation scores of zero. 
d. Seven participants had either 1 or 2 scales that they had provided invariant 
responses for. Because all of these scales are multidimensional (several of 
which are diametrically opposed), it is unlikely that invariant responses reflect 
true participant attitudes. These responses were, therefore, deleted. 
i. Note, this alteration is reflected only in the version of the dataset with 
all values copied and pasted as text. 
Table 4. Invariant responding participant removals 
ID TOT SDc score Scales with SD of zero Decision Made 
F9KYZA 2 Part A essay, Part B behavior Scores deleted 
BKB2A 2 
Part A behavior, Part B 
behavior 
Scores deleted 
53I7A 2 
Part A behavior, Part B 
behavior 
Scores deleted 
FVBYIB 1 Part A behavior Scores deleted 
5AV4B 1 Part A essay Scores deleted 
0GDXB 1 Part B behavior Scores deleted 
OOFFA 1 Part B behavior Scores deleted 
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No scales were required to be reverse coded. The final change made prior to creating the 
final data set was to reverse the scale of the PA measure so that negative values reflect more 
punishment of the victim (Participant A) relative to the bully (Participant B; under column 
PA2).  
The finalized version of the data set was saved as a new file titled “Groves – diss – study 2 – 
cleaned and coded”  
  
Note: Bolded content identifies information used to mark participants for removal. 
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APPENDIX R.  STUDY 2 INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
LETTER 
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APPENDIX S.  STUDY 2 MANIPULATION CHECKS 
The following questions inquire about the other two participants in the study. To the 
best of your ability, please rate the other participants on the following statements using the 
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. As a reminder, none of your 
responses will be seen by the other two participants. 
The following questions refer to Participant A 
1. This participant was helpful. 
2. This participant was rude. 
3. This participant was cooperative. 
4. This participant was kind. 
5. This person was aggressive. 
6. This participant was competitive. 
7. If I were to do this task again, I would like to interact with this person. 
8. This person deserves to win the gift card. 
9. This person should be punished for how they acted in the task. 
The following questions refer to Participant B 
1. This participant was helpful. 
2. This participant was rude. 
3. This participant was cooperative. 
4. This participant was kind. 
5. This person was aggressive. 
6. This participant was competitive. 
7. If I were to do this task again, I would like to interact with this person. 
8. This person deserves to win the gift card. 
9. This person should be punished for how they acted in the task. 
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APPENDIX T.  PARTICIPANT ROLES AND NAMES HANDOUT 
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APPENDIX U.  CODE USED FOR STUDY 2 ANALYSES 
#libraries used: gplots 
#Preliminary analyses 
mean(DissStudy2$PAhelp, na.rm=TRUE) 
mean(DissStudy2$PBhelp, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PAhelp, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBhelp, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAhelp,DissStudy2$PBhelp, paired=TRUE) 
 
mean(DissStudy2$PArude, na.rm=TRUE) 
mean(DissStudy2$PBrude, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PArude, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBrude, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PArude,DissStudy2$PBrude, paired=TRUE) 
 
mean(DissStudy2$PAcoop, na.rm=TRUE) 
mean(DissStudy2$PBcoop, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PAcoop, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBcoop, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcoop,DissStudy2$PBcoop, paired=TRUE) 
 
mean(DissStudy2$PAkind, na.rm=TRUE) 
mean(DissStudy2$PBkind, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PAkind, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBkind, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAkind,DissStudy2$PBkind, paired=TRUE) 
 
mean(DissStudy2$PAaggr, na.rm=TRUE) 
mean(DissStudy2$PBaggr, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PAaggr, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBaggr, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAaggr,DissStudy2$PBaggr, paired=TRUE) 
 
mean(DissStudy2$PAcomp, na.rm=TRUE) 
mean(DissStudy2$PBcomp, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PAcomp, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBcomp, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcomp,DissStudy2$PBcomp, paired=TRUE) 
 
mean(DissStudy2$PAlike, na.rm=TRUE) 
mean(DissStudy2$PBlike, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PAlike, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBlike, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAlike,DissStudy2$PBlike, paired=TRUE) 
 
mean(DissStudy2$PAwin, na.rm=TRUE) 
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mean(DissStudy2$PBwin, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PAwin, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBwin, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAwin,DissStudy2$PBwin, paired=TRUE) 
 
mean(DissStudy2$PApunish, na.rm=TRUE) 
mean(DissStudy2$PBpunish, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PApunish, na.rm=TRUE) 
sd(DissStudy2$PBpunish, na.rm=TRUE) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PApunish,DissStudy2$PBpunish, paired=TRUE) 
 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommSrs, vulnFact2, mean, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommNice, vulnFact2, mean, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommRude, vulnFact2, mean, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommAloof, vulnFact2, mean, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommShy, vulnFact2, mean, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommTimid, vulnFact2, mean, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommAssert, vulnFact2, mean, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommAggr, vulnFact2, mean, na.rm=TRUE) 
 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommSrs, vulnFact2, sd, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommNice, vulnFact2, sd, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommRude, vulnFact2, sd, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommAloof, vulnFact2, sd, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommShy, vulnFact2, sd, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommTimid, vulnFact2, sd, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommAssert, vulnFact2, sd, na.rm=TRUE) 
tapply(DissStudy2$PAcommAggr, vulnFact2, sd, na.rm=TRUE) 
 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcommNice,DissStudy2$vulnFact2) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcommRude,DissStudy2$vulnFact2) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcommAloof,DissStudy2$vulnFact2) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcommShy,DissStudy2$vulnFact2) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcommTimid,DissStudy2$vulnFact2) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcommAssert,DissStudy2$vulnFact2) 
t.test(DissStudy2$PAcommAggr,DissStudy2$vulnFact2) 
 
#Preliminary work: factor creation 
genderFactor <- factor(DissStudy2$gender, levels=c(1,2),labels=c("male","female")) 
table(genderFactor) 
 
DissStudy2$condVuln2 <- ifelse(DissStudy2$Condition==1 | DissStudy2$Condition==3,1,0) 
vulnFact2 <- factor(DissStudy2$condVuln2, levels=c(0,1),labels=c("non-
Vulnerable","Vulnerable")) 
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perspFact2 <- factor(DissStudy2$PerspCond, levels=c(1,2),labels=c("Imagine Other","Stay 
Objective")) 
 
DissStudy2$vulnFact <- ordered(DissStudy2$PA2, levels=c(0,1),labels=c("non-
Vulnerable","Vulnerable")) 
 
#Study 2 analyses: 
 
ANOVAOneway <- aov(PA2 ~ Condition, data=DissStudy2) 
ANOVA22 <- aov(PA2 ~ perspFact2*vulnFact2, data=DissStudy2) 
ANOVA2x2x2 <- aov(PA2 ~ perspFact2 * vulnFact2 * gender, data=DissStudy2) 
summary(ANOVAOneway) 
summary(ANOVA22) 
summary(ANOVA2x2x2) 
 
#descriptives 
tapply(PA2, condVuln2, mean) 
tapply(PA2, condVuln2, sd) 
 
tapply(PA2, PerspCond, mean) 
tapply(PA2, PerspCond, sd) 
 
#Plots 
plotmeans(PA2~perspFact2,  
     main="Effect of Perspective Taking on Prosocial Aggression",  
     xlab="Perspective Taking Manipulation",  
     ylab="Prosocial Aggression", 
     ylim=c(0, 130)) 
 
plotmeans(PA2~perspFact2,  
     main="Effect of Vulnerability Manipulation on Prosocial Aggression",  
     xlab="Vulnerability Manipulation",  
     ylab="Prosocial Aggression", 
     ylim=c(0, 130)) 
 
 
